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Abstract 
 Revisiting the Environmental Kuznets Curve in the presence of trade 
 Biva Arani Mallik, Ph.D. 
 Concordia University, 2018 
In my research I have investigated the impact of trade on the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (EKC). I investigate the impact on the level and curvature of the EKC 
by varying the degree of export and import. 
In my first paper, I have revisited the Andreoni and Levinson (2001) model in the 
presence of trade. In their original work, they conclude that the desired relationship 
between pollution and income can be traced only when there exists increasing 
returns to abatement technology. I have built upon the model by introducing trade 
and heterogeneity in abatement technology. I conclude when pollution sources from 
production and countries engage in trade, increasing returns to abatement 
technology no longer remains a necessary condition for a country to experience 
the EKC. When countries experience CRS or DRS, engaging in trade with countries 
with IRS enables them to attain the EKC. This however is possible only in the case of 
transboundary pollutants. 
 For my second paper, I look at the impact of trade on the multi-country 
framework of EKC developed by Diamantoudi and Filippiadis (2010). Introducing 
trade shows that pollution dependence among countries can exist even when the 
nature of pollutants is local in addition to the case of global pollutants. Results 
show that the impact of trade is more favorable for local pollutants both for the 
shape of the EKC and the scope for pollution substitution. 
My third paper is an extension of my second paper where I investigate the impact 
of trade on the multi-country framework when technology is heterogeneous. When 
countries of different levels of technology engage in trade with each other, it is 
iv 
found that the relative level of technology has an impact on the scope of pollution 
substitution as well as the EKC. Results of this paper reveal that when the level of 
technology of the foreign country is better, engaging in imports, and when the 
level of technology of the home country is better, engaging in exports helps the 
scope of pollution substitution as well as the shape of EKC. 
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Essay1: Revisiting \The simple
analytics of the environmental Kuznets
curve" - in the presence of trade
1.1 Introduction
The Environmental Kuznets Curve postulates an inverted U- relationship
between pollution and per capita income.It explains that at the initial stages
of a countries' development pollution increases with economic growth, where as
with further development, pollution starts to go down. A similar relationship be-
tween income inequality and per capita income was identied and made popular
by Kuznets (1955) which was named the Kuznets Curve. In the 1990s environ-
mental economists replaced income inequality with environmental quality, and
the term `Environment' was added to introduce the idea of the Environmental
Kuznets Curve.
Whether such a relationship exists or not is crucial for policy relevance.
While opponents of the EKC look for strong policy interventions that may at
times limit economic growth, proponents argue for pro-growth policies. Even
if the existence of an EKC holds, it is still subject to many questions and
speculations. Does the relationship hold for specic types of pollutants only, or
for pollution in general? At what point of economic growth does the turning
point occur? Does the environment start to revive with economic growth at some
feasible level of growth, or at extremely high rates which might not be feasible
for many poorer countries? Due to its strong policy relevance and implications
for economic growth analysis of the EKC has gained increasing popularity since
its initiation in the early 1990s.
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The concept of an EKC evolved in the early 1990s through empirical ob-
servations and were documented by Grossman and Krueger (1991), Shak and
Bandyopadhyay (1992), and Panayotou (1993). These studies were based on
cross country data on local air and water pollutants such as CO;NOx; SOx,
suspended particulate matter, municupal waste and lead. They later gave eco-
nomic insights behind the existence of the EKC through (i) the scale eect, (ii)
the technology eect and (iii) the composition eect. With such an initiation,
work on the existence, persistence and rationale for the EKC continued. Some
economists focused on empirical evidence behind the existence of an EKC while
others tried to model and give structure and reasoning behind the relationship1.
Around the same time (1990s) another burgeoning debate that emerged for
environmental policy makers was the issue of globalization and free trade. The
debate circled over the environmental consequences of countries engaging in
trade and thereby enjoying trade led growth. Clearly the two issues are inter-
twined. The concept of an EKC looks at the implications for environmental
quality with economic growth. Trade adds a dimension to the discussion in that
it hastens economic growth but at the same time it is speculated to enhance
production/ consumption and thus pollution. Whether or how trade aected
the existence of an EKC remained to be seen. Some light on the issue has
been shed by Arrow et al (1995), Suri and Chapman (1998) and Copeland and
Taylor (2001). The crux of discussion in the rst two papers lie in the idea
that as countries develop they switch to cleaner products, while still maintain-
ing a demand for the dirtier products - the production responsibility of which
falls into the shoulders of the poorer countries. In the latter paper, Copeland
and Taylor develop a north-south model, where they show that the developed
countries maintain stricter environmental regulations and therefore create an
incentive for dirtier industries to relocate to the developing world - a concept
1A detailed discussion of the various work is included in the Literature Review.
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known as the pollution haven. All the models pose a rather pessimistic picture
of the impact of trade on the environment in that they showcase a pollution
transfer rather than pollution mitigation as a result of trade led growth.
In this paper, I would like to look at the impact of trade on a particular model
- that developed by Andreoni and Levinson (2001).The Andreoni and Levinson
(2001) model show that the shape/existence of the Environmental Kuznet's
Curve can be explained by a technological link between consumption of a given
good and abatement of its undesirable bi-product. It is a well documented
model in Environmental Economics and has been widely sighted in literature.
The model species that the desired inverted-U relationship between pollution
and per capita income exists only under the assumption of increasing returns to
abatement technology.They show that when countries exhibit constant returns
or decreasing returns to abatement technology the pollution-income path follows
a linearly increasing or a U- shaped pattern respectively.
The existence or plausibility of an increasing returns to abatement tech-
nology has been questioned in literature. Such a form of technology suggests
that doubling pollution and abatement eorts should more than double emis-
sion reduction. There is evidence of such a phenomenon in some cases, but
the contrary is also true. Managi (2006) uses empirical evidence on environ-
mental risks in the US agriculture sector since 1970 to establish the existence
of increasing returns to abatement technology. In their own paper, Andreoni
and Levinson (2001) provide evidence of the existence of increasing returns to
abatement technology when abatement eorts involve high xed costs with low
marginal costs (example: installing scrubbers on a smoke stack). Such high
cost technologies become feasible only after economies are wealthy enough and
polluted enough. Such an explanation itself suggests that when countries are
poor, they may be required to invest in abatement options that have lower xed
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costs with higher marginal costs of operation. These economies are more likely
to experience decreasing returns to abatement technology. Egli (2005) suggest
that rather than IRS, countries tend to exhibit fading IRS, meaning that at
initial stages, when pollution level is high, abatement exhibits the feature of
increasing returns. However, as the environment gets cleaner, cleaning up the
last speck becomes more resource intensive at which point the abatement eorts
may exhibit constant returns to abatement technology.
In short, while increasing returns to abatement technology does exist for
many countries, it does not for many others. A lot of countries exhibit con-
stant returns or more commonly decreasing returns to abatement technology.
Typically, low income countries that rely on more traditional means of pro-
duction, tend to exhibit decreasing returns to abatement technology.Support of
decreasing returns to abatement technology can also be found in literature. For
example, in coals y-ash landlls, in order to reduce the level of ne dust over
the ground, water sprays are traditionally used. Such use of water is expensive
both in terms of hiring water tanks as well as using water resources (Careddu
et al. 2015). Amigues et al. (2014) write a paper assessing the optimal time
of Carbon Capture Sequestration policies when abatement technologies exhibit
decreasing returns to scale.
By introducing trade to the Andreoni and Levinson model in this paper,
I try to identify whether engaging in trade can bring about an EKC pattern
in the pollution-income path for countries that do not enjoy increasing returns
to abatement technology. I modify the Andreoni and Levinson model in three
ways: (i) I introduce trade to the model, (ii) I introduce heterogeneity in the
abatement technology and (iii) in addition to viewing pollution sourcing from
consumption I also model the case where pollution sources from production of
the consumption good. The second modication is justied in that the dierence
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in technology adds as a basis for motivation to trade. The explanation for the
third modication comes from the fact that often abatement eorts are under-
taken at the production stage rather than the consumption stage of a product's
life cycle. Hence I look at both cases - i.e pollution sourcing from consumption
as well as pollution sourcing from production. Having made these three adjust-
ments, I take into account the existence of a pollution externality. I argue that
the extent of pollution externality can vary between 0 (where pollutants are
strictly local) and 1 (where pollutants are transboundary). Thus the question
that I answer in this paper is : \How does the shape of the income-pollution
path of an economy change from the predictions of the Andreoni and Levinson
model, when countries with dierent abatement technology and varying degrees
of pollution externality engage in trade with each other?"
In the paper, trade is deliberately kept exogenous because the purpose of the
paper is not to explain how much or why countries should engage in trade, but
rather how the model predictions change subject to varying degrees of trade.
Thus to be able to vary the degree of export and imports, these variables have
been kept exogenous to the model. As mentioned earlier, I have looked at two
distinct sources of pollution - pollution emerging from consumption goods and
pollution emerging from production of the consumption goods. When pollution
sources from consumption, the model predictions of the Andreoni and Levin-
son model remain unchanged. Even though trade aects optimal decision with
respect to consumption, optimal abatement eorts and the optimal level of pol-
lution and the implications of abatement technology remain unchanged from
the original model. Next the paper investigates the impact of trade when pollu-
tion is sourced from production of the consumption good. In this case, dierent
results are obtained.Here, the model concludes that even when countries do not
enjoy increasing returns to abatement technology, so long as they engage in
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trade with countries that do, the desirable inverted U pattern of a pollution-
income path can be attained. This however is possible only when there exists
some degree of pollution externality between the trading countries.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. In section 1.2,
I present a review of the existing literature. The Model is presented in section
1.3 with the results and implications for trade in section 1.4. In section 1.5 the
ndings of the earlier sections are demonstrated through a pragmatic selection
of parameters. Finally, section 1.6 concludes the paper with some scope for
further discussion.
1.2 Literature Review
The concept of EKC was initiated in the early 1990s when debate revolving
around the role of economic growth on the impact of environmental quality had
reached a high after continuing for over two decades. Early on, it was believed
that natural resources and a clean environment could not be sustained for ever,
if the economies continued to grow unabated (Georgescu-Roegen,1971). Oth-
ers such as Meadows et al. ( 1972) argued that population growth and the use
of natural resources increases exponentially whereas the extraction and discov-
ery of natural resources occur linearly, thereby causing an eventual depletion
and exhaustion of natural resources with time. In the early 1990s a group of
economists observed a dynamic nature of pollution where pollution at rst in-
creases with economic growth and then eventually declines. Such an inverted
U-shaped relationship was at rst pointed out by empirical studies of Grossman
and Krueger (1991), Shak and Bandyopadhyay (1992), and Panayotou (1993).
These studies were based on cross country data on local air and water pollutants
such as CO;NOx; SOx;suspended particulate matter, municipal waste and lead.
They later gave economic insights behind the existence of the EKC through (i)
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the scale eect, (ii) the technology eect and (iii) the composition eect. They
explained that at the initial stages of economic development, the scale eect
dominates whereby as economies grow they engage in larger scales of opera-
tion and thus increased pollution. However, with continued economic growth,
countries switch to cleaner technologies or products. Thus at this stage the
technology eect and the composition eect takes over, and pollution starts to
go down. On a dierent note, Arrow et al. (1995) pointed out that the shape of
the EKC traces the natural progression of economic growth as countries evolve
from clean agrarian societies to polluting industrial economies to clean service
based economies.The concept of EKC thus promoted the idea that environmen-
tal pollution should not be viewed as a cause of obstructing economic growth.
In fact Beckerman (1992) writes that \In the end the best - and probably the
only- way to attain a decent environment in most counties is to become rich".
Following this a number of economists focused attention on trying to model
and thus give structure to the understanding of the EKC. One group of models
were focused on the income elasticity of pollution. It is argued that the income
elasticity of pollution is greater than one and thus with rising income a demand
for a cleaner environment emerges. Along this line, John and Pecchenino (1994)
present an overlapping generations model in which environmental quality is a
stock resource that degrades with time unless maintained by investments in the
environment. At the beginning an economy begins with zero pollution and sees
its environment deteriorate with increased growth. After some point in time,
pollution increases to the point that investment in environment becomes desir-
able and thus pollution starts to decline. The model thus presented by John
and Pecchenino predicts an inverted V shaped relationship between pollution
and income. Similary, Jaeger (1998) model that low levels of economic growth
portray low levels of pollution where the consumers marginal benet to addi-
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tional environmental quality is zero. Therefore, at this stage more pollution
does not lead to lower utility. With growth and further pollution, consumers
become sensitive to increased pollution at which point, depending on the param-
eters, growth may be accompanied by improved environmental quality. Again,
Jaeger's pollution-income relationship is inverse V shaped, peaking when the
optimum moves from a corner solution to an interior solution.
Yet another group of economists have created models upon the explanation
that with economic growth, some constraints become non-binding and when
economies take advantage of these new opportunities, pollution can start to go
down. For example, Jones and Manuelli (1995) posit that pollution involves ex-
ternalities and appropriate internalization of these externalities is possible with
advanced institutions that can be aorded only by developed economies. Along
this line of explanation, Jones and Manuelli developed an overlapping genera-
tions model where economic growth is determined by market interactions and
pollution is set through the collective decision making of the younger genera-
tion. The shape of the pollution-income path in this case is set by the nature of
the decision making institution the shape can be an inverted U, monotonically
increasing or even a \sideways mirrored S". Stokey (1998), describe a static
model with a range of possible production technologies. At the initial stages
of economic growth, only the dirtiest technologies are economically feasible and
thus pollution increases with growth. After some threshold of income is reached,
the cleaner technologies become economically feasible, adoption of which causes
pollution to go down. Thus again, the anticipated pollution- income path follows
an inverted V relationship.
The 1990s also witnessed the emergence of globalization and free trade. The
era was thus wrought with debates over free trade and its impact on the envi-
ronment. Several studies explaining how trade could explain the shape of the
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EKC also emerged along this time. Arrow et al. (1995) use international trade to
explain the shape of the EKC. They argue that as economies grow, they switch
to cleaner products but there continues to be a demand for the dirty products
which gets satiated by importing from the less developed economies. Along the
same line, Suri and Chapman (1998) explain that as economies grow they tend
to transfer the dirty industries to the developing world and thereby enjoy cleaner
environment. It is also believed, that as economies grow they can aord better
institutions and thus higher environmental regulations. Such restrictions create
incentives for the dirtier industries to relocate to poorer economies with lower
environmental regulations. Such a north- south model is developed by Copeland
and Taylor (2001) to investigate the linkages between national income, pollution
and international trade. All these papers provide a bleak picture where as all
countries in the world grow, they will no longer have a poorer country to fall
back upon! On a more positive note Dean (1999) nd that trade liberalization
directly aggravates environmental damage via its inuence on the terms of trade,
but indirectly mitigates it via its eect on income growth. Holladay (2008) look
at the impact of trade liberalization on the environment. He focuses on two
distinct sources of pollution - pollution from consumption and pollution from
production, and concludes that pollution from consumption increases where as
pollution from production decreases after trade liberalization. In all these pa-
pers, the distinction between local pollutants and transboundary pollutants is
absent.
There also exists a wide pool of literature looking into the empirical evi-
dence of the existence of the EKC. Selden and Song (1994) have conrmed the
inverted U relationship between pollution and per capital GDP using a cross-
national panel of data on emission of four air pollutants: suspended particulate
matter, sulfur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, and carbon monoxide. However, they
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predicted that emissions to decrease only in the very long run with rapid growth
on global emissions to continue for several decades. Grossman and Kreuger
(1995) also examine the relationship between per capita GDP and four envi-
ronmental indicators and conclude in favor of the existence of the EKC. They
further provide with some intuitive explanations for the downward sloping part
of the EKC. They explain that as countries grow several factors come into play
to cause the downward trend of pollutants. First, with growth more stringent
environmental policies are adopted as with economic prosperity non economic
aspects of life such as a clean environment become more desirable for economic
agents. Second, as economies grow they cease to produce some of the dirtier
products and start to import them instead. Finally, with time and learning
from the experiences of the wealthier countries, countries may adopt cleaner
technologies.
In recent times, much of the empirical work has focused on transboundary
pollutants. For example, Apergis (2016) looks at the existence of the EKC in the
emission of CO2across fteen countries and concludes that it does in twelve out
of the fteen countries. Bilgili et al. (2016) also look at the empirical evidence
based on the emission of CO2. However, rather than explaining the downward
sloping part of the EKC with income growth, they attribute it to a shift in
renewable energy with time. Jebli et al. (2016) also study the existence of
EKC using CO2:They examine the impact of renewable energy, non- renewable
energy and trade on the shape of EKC in OECD countries.
There is vast support in literature on the existence of the EKC. This paper
investigates the impact of trade on an existing model that suggests that the
shape of the EKC can be explained under strict parametric restrictions. The
paper attempts to see if some of the restrictions can be relaxed when trade is
brought into the picture.
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1.3 The Model
Consider a model with two countries i 2 f1; 2g:Each country produces only
one consumption good Ci for i = 1; 2. For simplicity assume that each of them
are a single agent country. Of the consumption good Ci that is produced, each
country retains a fraction of it for own consumption and exports the rest to the
other country. The fraction of Ci retained by a country is i. Note that i kept
exogenous to the model as the objective of the model is to see the impact on the
predictions of Andreoni and Levinson (2001) by varying the degrees of iwith
i = 1; 2.
Utility in each country is a function of the consumption goods (locally pro-
duced and imported) and pollution - Ui = U(C1; C2; P );where utility is increas-
ing in consumption and decreasing in pollution. Utility is quasi-concave in C1,
C2, and  P . In addition, each country faces a resource constraint in the form of
income per capita Mi:The resource of the country is used up in the consumption
of the two commodities and in abatement eorts to mitigate pollution.
The model views pollution from two sources: from consumption of C1and
C2 and from production of C1 and C2 . The model also distinguishes between
local pollutants and global pollutants. Each country engages in some abatement
eort which is captured by the term Ei ; i 2 f1; 2g. These terms include all
resources spent towards pollution mitigation. It can be considered as investing
in preventive measures to arrest pollution growth or as spending in resources
for cleaning up eorts. Therefore, pollution in a given country is increasing
in either (i) consumption of of C1and C2, or (ii) production of C1and C2; and
decreasing in abatement eorts - P = P (C1; C2; E1; E2). A summary of the
dierent types of pollution considered is presented in the table below:
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Table 1.1: The dierent Sources of Pollution
Local Pollution Trans-boundary Pollution
Source
Consumpiton of C1 and C2 Consumpiton of C1and C2
Production of C1and C2 Production of C1and C2
When the local pollutants of every country are summed up, we get the
trans-boundary pollution. The model is thus developed in two parts: Part 1
looks at the case where pollution is sourcing from consumption and Part 2 looks
into the case of pollution sourcing from production.
1.3.1 Model 1 - When pollution is sourced from consumption
Consider a two country case, where the utility of each country looks as
follows:
U1 = 1C1 + (1  2)C2   z1P (1a)
U2 = (1  1)C1 + 2C2   z2P (1b)
where z1 and z2 are the marginal disutilities associated with pollution. The
resource constraint faced by the two countries are:
M1 = 1C1 + (1  2)C2 + E1 (2a)
M2 = (1  1)C1 + 2C2 + E2 (2b)
The pollution function for each country is:
P1 = 1C1 + (1  2)C2   (1C1 + (1  2)C2)1E11 (3a)
P2 = (1  1)C1 + 2C2   ((1  1)C1 + 2C2)2E22 (3b)
Pi represents the net pollution generated in each country. In each country
pollution is generated by the consumption of goods. The last term represents the
abatement technology. Abatement increases in C as well as E:The i subscripts
to  and  show that the abatement technology in each country is dierent.
Thus heterogeneity is introduced to the model. In the model, transboundary
pollution P is thus viewed accordingly:
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P = P1 + lP2 where l = [0; 1] (4)
when l takes the value of 0, it means the model views only local pollution -
that generated only in country 1; and when 0 < l < 1it means that there is some
degree of permeation (but not complete) among the pollutants. Finally when l
takes a value of 1, the model is viewing global pollution. Pollutant emitted in
one country completely aects the other.
For simplicity allow z1 = z2 = 1:Thus plugging the value of P in the utility
function (1a) and substituting for the value of (1   2)C2 from the resource
constraint (2a) into (1a), the social utility function that the planner of Country
1 seeks to optimize is:
U1 = M1 C1 lC2 E1+(1C1+(1 2)C2)1E11 +l(M2 E2)2E22 (5)
The rst order solution to the problem gives the optimal amount of con-







When countries engage in trade the optimal consumption decision of own
commodity changes. As the fraction of goods imported from the foreign country
goes up, Ci goes down. As countries choose to retain larger fractions for own
consumption, Ci goes down. In other words, when they choose to export larger







The abatement eort of a country remains unchanged with a decision to
engage in trade or not.
Plugging in the optimal decisions in the pollution function, the optimal
pollution function for Country 1 becomes:
P = 1M11+1 ( 11+1 )1(
1
1+1





The slope to the Kuznets' Curve is the rst derivative of the pollution func-
tion with respect to M1:
@P
@M1




Thus it is seen that the shape of the EKC is determined entirely by its own
abatement technology. The technology of the second country does not aect the
income pollution relationship of country 1 in any way. Engaging in trade does
not aect the slope of the income-pollution path.The second order derivative to
the pollution income relationship gives:
@2P
@M21




Therefore, the income pollution path will follow the desired inverted U-
shape only in the case where countries exhibit increasing returns to abatement
technology, i.e +  > 1: The predictions of the Andreoni and Levinson Model
remains unchanged even after I introduce trade when pollution sources from
consumption of goods.
1.3.2 Model 2 - when pollution is sourced from production of the
consumption goods.
In this section I look into the implications of trade by developing the model
when pollution is sourced from production. This approach is quite reasonable in
that the abatement technology of many pollutants are applied at the production
rather than the consumption stage of a product life.
When pollutions is sourced from production of the consumption goods, the
pollution functions for the two countries take the following form:
P1 = C1   C11 E11 (6a)
P2 = C2   C22 E22 (6b)
and thus the transboundary pollution faced by Country 1 becomes:
P = P1 + lP2 (6)
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Again plugging in the value of P in the utility function (1a) and substituting
for the value of (1 2)C2 from the resource constraint (2a) into (1a), the utility
function we are seeking to optimize this time is:
U1 = M1   C1   lC2   E1 + C11 E11 + lC22 E22 (7)















When pollution is sourced from production of the consumption goods, abate-
ment eorts are also aected by trade. How trade will aect the optimal pollu-
tion remains ambiguous.
By plugging in the optimal decisions, pollution function can now be written
as:
P = 1(22+2)M1 12(1 2)M2(22+2)(11+1) 12(1 1)(1 2)






2 [ 2(11+1)M2 21(1 1)M1(22+2)(11+1) 12(1 1)(1 2) ]
2g
The equation above is complex to look at. To give it a meaningful perspec-
tive, we group some of the terms in the following ways:
Let, A = (22 + 2)(11 + 1)  12(1  1)(1  2)
B = 2(1  2)M2
C = (11 + 1)M2
We can then write the pollution function in the following manner:
P = 1(22+2)M1 1BA   [1A ]1 [1A ]1 [(22 + 2)M1  B]1+1+
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lf2C 21(1 1)M1A   [2A ]2 [2A ]2 [C   1(1  1)M1]2+2g (8)
The pattern of the income- pollution path that this model predicts is dis-
cussed in Section 4.
1.4 Results and implications of trade
As has been shown in the previous section, when pollution sources from
production, the optimal pollution function becomes as follows:
P = 1(22+2)M1 1BA   [1A ]1 [1A ]1 [(22 + 2)M1  B]1+1+
lf2C 21(1 1)M1A   [2A ]2 [2A ]2 [C   1(1  1)M1]2+2g (8)
The rst derivative of the equation above, with respect to the income of
Country 1 will give the slope of the income-pollution path for country 1.
@P
@M1
= 1(22+2)A   (1 + 1)(22 + 2)[1A ]1 [1A ]1 [(22 + 2)M1  
B]1+1 1+
lf12(1 1)A  (2+2)1(1 1)[2A ]2 [2A ]2 [C 1(1 1)M1]2+2 1g (9)
Equation 9 shows that the slope of the income-pollution path depends upon:
a) abatement technology of both the home country and the foreign country,
b) the degree of trade; and
c) the degree of pollution externality.
1.4.1 Implications of abatement technology for home country and
foreign country
Proposition 1 When (i) pollution is sourced from production of a consumption
good, (ii) countries engage in trade, and (iii) there exists pollution externality;
increasing returns to trade no longer remains a necessary condition for a country
to obtain the EKC pattern in the income pollution path when the nature of pol-
lutant is transboundary. A sucient condition for Country1 becomes to engage
in trade with Country 2 who enjoys increasing returns to abatement technology.
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Proof. To see what shape the income-pollution path will take, we look at the
second derivative with respect to income.
@2P
@M21
=  (1 + 1   1)(1 + 1)(22 + 2)2[1A ]1 [1A ]1 [(22 + 2)M1  




< 0 either one of the following conditions have to be satised.
(i) Both countries display increasing returns to abatement technology. If both
1 + 1 > 0 and 2 + 2 > 0 then the second derivative with respect to income
will be negative and income pollution path will follow the desired inverted U-
pattern. This is similar to the ndings of the Andreoni and Levinson Model.
(ii) Country 1 displays increasing returns to abatement technology, but the
abatement technology of Country 2 does not follow IRS. In this case the second
derivative will be negative so long as:
(1 +1 1)(1 +1)(22 +2)2[1A ]1 [1A ]1 [(22 +2)M1 B]1+1 2 >
 lf(2+2 1)(2+2)21(1 1)2[2A ]2 [2A ]2 [C 1(1 1)M1]2+2 2g
Again the condition is similar to that of the Andreoni and Levinson in that
Country 1 must display IRS; but when they engage in trade with a nation that
does not, an additional condition is imposed for the income-pollution path to
follow the EKC pattern.
(iii) Finally, Country 1 does not need to display IRS so long as Country 2
does and
lf(2+2 1)(2+2)21(1 1)2[2A ]2 [2A ]2 [C 1(1 1)M1]2+2 2g >
(1 + 1   1)(1 + 1)(22 + 2)2[1A ]1 [1A ]1 [(22 + 2)M1  B]1+1 2
Thus when countries engage in international trade, when pollution sources
from production of the consumption goods, IRS is no longer a necessary con-
dition for countries to follow the EKC pattern in their income-pollution paths.
The desired EKC pattern can be obtained by engaging in trade with countries
that follow IRS. When Country 1 displays CRS, the second order derivative to
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the income pollution path becomes:
@P 2
@M21
=  lf(2 + 2   1)(2 + 2)((1 1)A )222 22 [C 1(1 1)M1A ]2+2 2
This shows that when Country 1 does not engage in trade, the income pollu-
tion path will be linear. When they engage in trade with Country 2, the income
pollution path will follow a quadratic pattern. So long as Country 2 displays
IRS the income pollution path of Country 1 will follow the inverted U-shaped




=  (1 + 1   1)(1 + 1)(22 + 2)[1A ]1 [1A ]1 [(22 + 2)M1  
B]1+1 2 lf(2+2 1)1(1 1)(2+2)[2A ]2 [2A ]2 [C 1(1 1)M1]2+2 2g
At lower levels of income, the value of [(22 + 2)M1   B] is low and so
the value of [C   1(1  1)M1] is high. Therefore, Country 1's own technology
dominates the shape of the income pollution path, and with DRS, the shape
follows the predicted U shape pattern. But with higher levels of income, [(22+
2)M1   B] starts to become larger, while [C   1(1  1)M1] starts to become
smaller. At this point the second part of the equation (the part dened by the
abatement technology of the foreign country) starts to dominate. In that case,
so long as country 2 exhibits IRS, the income pollution path of Country 1 will
follow a U shape at low levels of income, but the inverted U pattern at higher
levels of income. Thus in the words of Jones and Manuelli (1995), the income
pollution pattern will follow that of a `side ways mirrored S'.
The proof above shows the necessary condition needed for the concavity of
the income pollution path when country 1 engages in trade. To check for the
sucient condition for the inverted U shape of the income- pollution path the
slope of the income pollution path needs to be checked. Equation (9) shows the
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general slope of the income pollution path. When country 1 exhibits Constant
Returns to Abatement Technology (1 + 1 = 1), and country 2 exhibits In-
creasing Returns to Abatement Technology (2 + 2 > 1) equation (9) above
can be re-written as follows:
@P
@M1







lf12(1 1)A  (2+2)1(1 1)[2A ]2 [2A ]2 [C 1(1 1)M1]2+2 1g (10)
Setting @P@M1 = 0 , the turning point of the EKC comes to:













where A = (22 + 2)(11 + 1)  12(1  1)(1  2)




1.4.2 Implications of trade









The model collapses to the Andreoni and Levinson (2001) model. Engaging
in trade gives rise to the optimal pollution function as shown by equation (8).
Engaging in trade aects both the level of optimal pollution as well as the shape
of the income pollution path. When countries engage in trade the abatement
technologies of both countries have an impact on the income pollution path of
Country 1. The mechanism of the inuence has already been demonstrated
in Proposition 1. This part of the paper moves away from the discussion of
abatement technology and focuses attention on the impact of import and export.
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Proposition 2 When (i) pollution is sourced from production of a consumption
good, (ii) there exists pollution externality, and (iii) Country 2 exhibits IRS when
Country 1 does not, increasing the fraction of output of Country2 imported
into Country 1 decreases the optimal level of pollution, whereas, increasing the
fraction of own good exported increases the level of optimal pollution. However,
the impact of import and export on the slope of the income pollution path is
dierent.
Proof. From Equation 8, the optimal pollution path can be written as:

















The proof is carried in two steps. In the rst step I look at the impact of
import and export on the level of pollution. Then in the second step I look at
the impact of import and export on the curvature of the income- pollution path.
Step 1:























From Proposition 1 I have established that when Country 1 exhibits CRS or
DRS it is desirable to engage in trade with Country 2 who exhibits IRS. In
the appendix it is shown that @C1@(1 2) < 0. So long as Country 1 exhibits CRS








C1+1 11 ] > 0.
@C2
@(1 2) > 0 . Since Country 2








C2+2 12 ] < 0: Thus under the specications
@P
@(1 2) < 0. The larger the fraction of output of Country 2 imported, the lower
will be the optimal level of pollution.































C1+1 11 ] > 0
and @C1@(1 1) > 0. In the appendix it is shown that
@C2
@(1 1) < 0. Since Country 2








C2+2 12 ] < 0: Therefore, the impact of export
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on the optimal level of pollution will be positive.
In summary, engaging in imports decreases the optimal level of pollution
where as engaging in exports increases the optimal level of pollution.
Step 2
In this part I look at the impact of import and export on the curvature of




= 1(22+2)A   (1 + 1)(22 + 2)[1A ]1 [1A ]1 [(22 + 2)M1  
B]1+1 1+lf12(1 1)A  (2+2)1(1 1)[2A ]2 [2A ]2 [C 1(1 1)M1]2+2 1g
With a little bit of manipulation, the slope of the income pollution path can
be written in the following manner:
@P
@M1




















In the appendix it is shown that the impact of import on the slope of the
income pollution path is non-conclusive. However, the impact of export is more
likely to be positive.The desired inverted U shape of the income pollution path
is assured by the negativity of the second derivative of optimal pollution with
respect to income. From Condition (iii) of Proposition 1 it can be observed that
the higher the fraction of own output exported, the stronger will be the inequality.
Thus the negativity of the second order derivative is guaranteed.
Proposition 2 thus concludes that the impact of import and export is dis-
tinctly dierent. While import and export aects the level of optimal pollution
in opposite ways, export aects the pattern of the income pollution path in the
desired direction.
An interesting observation comes forth for the case where both countries ex-
hibit constant returns to scale in the abatement technology.When both countries
exhibit CRS in abatement technology, the optimal pollution function becomes:
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P = 1(22+2)M1 1BA  [1A ]1 [1A ]1 [(22+2)M1 B]+lf2C 21(1 1)M1A  
[2A ]
2 [2A ]
2 [C   1(1  1)M1]g (8a)
















However with varying degrees of export (1 1) and import ((1 2)) , we nd
that the magnitude of the slope can change. With no trade t = 1 andf = 1and
@P
@M1
in the equation above collapses to 1 11 11 which is a positive constant.
With no trade, we only observe a positive linear relationship between pollution
and economic growth. In order to capture the impact of trade, we take the
derivative of of @P@M1 separately with respect to 1 and 2. The derivative with







































This implies that as countries engage in more and more trade, the slope of
the income pollution path will change. Thus with some combination of 1 and
2 it is possible to attain a negative linear relationship between pollution and
economic growth.
1.4.3 The impact of pollution externality on the income-pollution
path
This part of the discussion is raised to distinguish between local pollution
and transboundary pollution. While some pollutants are local, others tend to
inltrate across boundaries. The degree of inltration might vary. In some
cases, pollution generated in one country permeates across to others, but the
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degree of permeation tends to go down with distance. In this case the degree
of inltration measured by l will be in between 0 and 1. In other cases, the
pollutant generated in one country may completely carry forward to the other
in which case the value of l will be 1.
I now try to look at how the dierence in the degree of permeation aects the
shape of the EKC in the model that I have developed. The pollution function
remains the same as in equation (8):
P = 1(22+2)M1 1BA   [1A ]1 [1A ]1 [(22 + 2)M1  B]1+1+
lf2C 21(1 1)M1A   [2A ]2 [2A ]2 [C   1(1  1)M1]2+2g (8)
The case of local pollutants: Clearly, when the nature of pollution is
absolutely local, l = 0, and the second part of the equation will collapse to 0.
This would mean that the shape of the EKC would be determined purely by
the abatement technology of the local country. The existence of trade in this
case will aect the level of pollution, but the curvature of the EKC will remain
just as predicted by the Andreoni and Levinson model.
The case of transboundary pollutants: When there exists pollution
externality (0 < l  1), it holds two implications for Country1. First the level
of pollution will be aected and second, there will be an impact on the income-
pollution path.
The rst impact that the degree of transboundariness has on pollution is its
level. In order to grasp that we look at the marginal impact of the degree of




A   [2A ]2 [2A ]2 [C   1(1  1)M1]2+2  0
This indicates that the higher the degree of externality, the higher will be
the level of pollution.
The second impact that the degree of has is how trade aects the cur-
vature of EKC. With higher degrees of (higher values of l) the dominance of
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the second part of the equation aecting the slope of EKC becomes stronger.
Proposition 3 When pollution is sourced from the production of a consump-
tion good, and when Country 1 engages in trade with Country 2 who exhibits
increasing returns to abatement technology, the higher the extent of external-
ity, lower is the required level of trade to bring about the inverted U pattern in
income pollution path.
Proof.
To begin with, the existence of pollution externality is necessary if the
abatement technology of the foreign country is to have any impact on the slope
of the income pollution path. When pollution externality is 0 in equation (9),
the second part of the equation becomes zero. Thus in that case the only way
that Country 1 can enjoy the EKC pattern is when they have IRS in abatement
technology. Thus the model predictions collapses to that of Andreoni and
Levinson. However, when pollution externality is positive, the impact of
abatement technology of trading country comes into play, and IRS no longer
remains a necessary condition for Country 1.
Next, the inequality in Condition (iii) of Proposition 1 must hold in order to
ensure the EKC pattern in the income pollution path, when Country 2 exhibits
IRS and Country 1 does not. This inequality becomes stronger the higher the
value of l. Therefore, when the value of l goes up, the value of (1   1) can be
brought down to maintain the inequality. I therefore conclude that the higher the
degree of of pollution, lower is the required level of trade in order to maintain
the EKC pattern in the pollution income path.
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1.5 Demonstration of results
From Section 1.4, I reach at three conclusions. First, when country 1 does not
display IRS, by engaging in trade with countries that do, the desired EKC pat-
tern in the income pollution path can be achieved when there exists pollution
externalities. Second, increasing the fraction of Country 2's output imported
aects the level of optimal pollution where as increasing the fraction of own
goods exported aects the curvature of the income pollution path. Finally, the
higher the degree of pollution externality, lower is the amount of trade required
to achieve the desired result.
In this section, I show some simulation results that reinforce my model pre-
dictions. To maintain clarity, I highlight each of the conclusions as dierent
cases.
Case1: Country 1 exhibits CRS but Country 2 exhibits IRS
Case 1 looks at situation where Country 1 displays CRS but engages in trade
with Country 2 who displays IRS. For simulation purposes, the values assigned
to the technology parameters are 1 = 0:6;1 = 0:4;2 = 0:7; and 2 = 0:5.
Two of the results are highlighted here. One that engaging in trade is bringing
about a change in the pattern of the income pollution path, and second that
engaging in trade is bringing down the optimal level of pollution.
Sans trade, 1 = 1 and 2 = 1,
@P
@M1
becomes (1   11 11 ) which is a pos-
itive constant, indicating a linear relationship between pollution and economic
growth.
25
Fig 1.1: Income pollution path of Country 1 when it experiences CRS
With income growth and Country 1 engaging in trade, the abatement tech-
nology of Country2 starts to inuence the income pollution path of Country 1
for the case of transboundary pollutants. The more country 1 engages in ex-
ports, the value of 1 becomes smaller, and the impact of the returns to scale
to technology of Country 2 becomes more prominent. The model predicts that
as long as 2 + 2 > 1,
@P 2
@M21
< 0 and thus the environmental Kuznets Curve is
represented through trade even though Country 1 displays constant returns to
scale.
Fig 1.2: Income pollution path of Country 1 when it engages in trade
Case 2: Country 1 exhibits DRS while country 2 exhibits IRS
Case 2 portrays the situation where Country1 having DRS chooses to engage
in trade with Country2 enjoying IRS. The model predicts that when Country
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1 does not engage in trade the income pollution path will follow a U pattern
as predicted by Andreon and Levinson (2001). Assuming that 1 = 0:5 and
1 = 0:3, the simulation results conrm the model predictions.
1. Fig 1.3: Income pollution path of Country 1 when it experiences DRS
But as country 1 engages in exports, and income growth, the abatement
technology of the trading partner starts to inuence the income pollution
relationship. When Country 2 enjoys IRS, let 2 = 0:7; 2 = 0:5, the
income pollution path eventually takes a downward trend. Thus, as
predicted in section 1.4, the shape followed by the income pollution path
resembles a sideways mirrored S.
Fig1. 4: Income pollution path of Country 1 when it engages in trade
Case 3: The impact of pollution externality
In this part I discuss the nal conclusion of the model developed in Section
1.2. The model predicts that abatement technology of the foreign country inu-
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ences the income pollution pattern of the home country only in the case where
there exists positive pollution externality of the foreign country. In other words,
when Country 1 faces transboundary pollution, and Country1 engages in trade
with Country2, the abatement technology of Country 2 will have an impact on
the income pollution relationship of Country1. The model further concludes
that the higher the extent of pollution externality, the abatement technology of
Country 2 will dominate more even with lower levels of trade.
I discuss the case for when Country 1 has CRS and engages in trade with
Country 2 having IRS. For example, suppose the parameter values assigned to
Country 1 and 2 are 1 = 0:6; 1 = 0:4 and 2 = 0:7; 2 = 0:5 respectively when
l = 0:6: With 30% exports and 30% imports, the desired shape of the EKC is
not quite achieved.
Fig 1.5: Income pollution path of Country1 when pollution externality is
low
But when l = 1, the desired shape can be attained with the same level of
trade. The diagrams below help illustrate the situation:
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Fig 1.6: Income pollution path of Country1 when pollution externality is
high
The graphs above clearly portray both aspects of the impact of degree of
on the model developed. As the degree of permeation increases, the level of
pollution goes up for country 1. However, higher the degree of permeation,
even if country 1 displays constant returns to scale, it can attain the desired
shape of EKC by engaging in little trade. This conclusion can be extended to
all the cases discussed above. But the gist of the matter remains that the higher
the level of pollution permeation, smaller the degree of trade required to achieve
desired results.
1.6 Conclusion
Economic growth and the environmental quality are clearly intertwined. The
concept of the Environmental Kuznets Curve gives a pragmatic explanation to
the relationship. To that end, Andreoni and Levinson (2001) provide a simple
theoretical model where the technological link between consumption of a desir-
able good and abatement of its undesirable bi-product can be used to explain
the existence of the EKC. However, the necessary condition of increasing returns
to abatement technology that they provide has been questioned in literature.
Whether IRS is always prevalent is a question of doubt. Also the implications
that he draws for those that fail to display IRS is quite desolate. When countries
exhibit constant returns to scale or decreasing returns to scale, the Andreoni
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and Levinson model predict the income pollution path to follow a linearly in-
creasing or U-shaped pattern. Policy implications for such economies would
be to restrict growth in the interest of the environment. Also, in their paper,
Andreoni and Levinson do not nd any distinction between local pollutants and
transboundary pollutants. For both type of pollutants their model predictions
remain unchanged.
In this paper, I look at the Andreoni and Levinson model in the presence
of trade. Even though my model conclusions are very much in line with the
ndings of the Andreoni and Levinson model, engaging in trade provides with a
way out for countries that fail to exhibit increasing returns to abatement tech-
nology. Along with introducing trade, I introduce heterogeneity with respect to
abatement technology. I look at two possible situation. First, I look at a situa-
tion where pollution is sourced from consumption of a given good just like the
original model. Even though introducing trade in this situation aects optimal
consumption decision, the impact on pollution income path or even the level of
pollution remain unchanged from the predictions of the original model.
As a second exercise, I introduce trade to the case where pollution is sourced
from production of the consumption good. Pollution in general does in fact
source from production in most cases and literature supports that. Also, abate-
ment technology is often applied at the production phase rather than the con-
sumption phase of a product's life. Therefore, such a deviation from the original
model is completely justied. In this case I nd that when nations do not ex-
hibit IRS in their abatement technology, by engaging in trade with countries
that do, it is possible to attain the desirable inverted-U-pattern in the income
pollution path. However, this is possible only in the case where pollution is
transboundary and not when pollution is local.
Therefore, the rst contribution of my model is that introducing trade allows
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to draw a distinction between local pollutants and transboundary pollutants.
Second, the model shows that for the case of transboundary pollutants the
pattern of inverted U in the income pollution path can be attained. Thus, when
countries do not enjoy increasing returns to abatement technology, engaging
in trade can enable them to bring about a downward pattern in the income




A.1 Solution to Model 3.1
For Country 1:
Utility: U1 = 1C1 + (1  2)C2   z1P (1)
Resource Constraint: M1 = 1C1 + (1  2)C2 + E1 (2)
Transboundary Pollution:
P = C1 + lC2   (1C1 + (1  2)C2)1E11   l((1  1)C1 + 2C2)2E22 (3)
The social planner will want to maximize utility subject to the resource
constraint.
Let z1 = 1:
Plugging in the value for (1  2)C2 from Equation 2, and substituting the
value for P in Equation 1, the maximization problem becomes:




= 1  1t(1C1 + (1  2)C2)1 1E11 = 0
@P
@E1
= 1  1(1  2)(1C1 + (1  2)C2)1E1 11 = 0














Plugging in the optimal value for C2 in C1, the general solutions for optimal









(1+2 1)(1+1)(2+2) and E2 =
2M2
2+2
A.2 Solution for Model 3.2
For Country 1:
Utility: U1 = 1C1 + (1  2)C2   z1P (1)
Resource Constraint: M1 = 1C1 + (1  2)C2 + E1 (2)
Transboundary Pollution: P = C1 + lC2   C11 E11   lC22 E22 (3)
The social planner will want to maximize utility subject to the resource
constraint.
Let z1 = 1:
Plugging in the value for (1  2)C2 from Equation 2, and substituting the
value for P in Equation 1, the maximization problem becomes:




= 1  1C1 11 E11 = 0
@P
@E1
= 1  1C11 E1 11 = 0








By symmetry, the optimal decisions for consumption and abatement eorts








Plugging in the optimal consumption decision of Country 2 in place of the














Proof of Proposition 2
The optimal pollution function is:
P = 1(22+2)M1 1BA   [1A ]1 [1A ]1 [(22 + 2)M1  B]1+1+
lf2C 21(1 1)M1A   [2A ]2 [2A ]2 [C   1(1  1)M1]2+2g (1)
Step 1
First I look at the impact of import and export on the optimal level of
pollution.
This can be written in the following way:

















In order to look at the impact of import on the optimal level of pollution,















































C1+1 11 ] > 0:








C2+2 12 ] < 0:
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Thus I conclude that under these circumstances, @P@(1 2) < 0: The larger the
fraction of output of Country 2 imported into Country 1, the lower will be the
optimal level of pollution.
























































C2+2 12 ] < 0:
Engaging in export will increase the optimal level of pollution.
Step 2




= 1(22+2)A  11 11 (1+1) (22+2)A [ (22+2)M1 2(1 2)M2A ]1+1 1 
lf12(1 1)A   22 22 (2 + 2)1(1 1)A [ (11+1)M2 1(1 1)M1A ]2+2 1g
With a little bit of manipulation, the slope of the income pollution path can
be written in the following manner:
@P
@M1


















































































C1+1 11 ] > 0:
(1 + 1   1) < 0 when Country 1 exhibits DRS. @C1@(1 2) < 0:Therefore, the









C2+2 12 ] > 0. (2+2 1) > 0 and @C2@(1 2) > 0:Therefore
lf:g is positive. The impact of import on the slope of the income pollution path
is non conclusive.






























































0:(1 + 1   1) < 0 and @C1@(1 1) > 0:Therefore the rst part of the eqution is
























@(1 2) < 0since the
derivative of C2with respect to (1  1) is negative. One can thus conclude that
the impact of export on the slope of the income pollution path will be positive.
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Essay 2: Revisiting \The Environmental
Kuznets Curve in a Multi-Country
Setting" in the presence of Trade - the
case of homogeneous technology
2.1 Introduction
That economic growth and the environmental quality of a country are in-
terdependent is obviously apparent. The existence of substantial environmental
resources - be it in the form of clean air and water for subsistence of human life
or in the form of extractable natural resources with opportunities for economic
exploitation - is a critical factor ensuring economic growth. Conversely, eco-
nomic activity is perhaps the most pertinent source of environmental degrada-
tion. With economic growth comes, exploitation of natural resources, increased
production, consumption and hence pollution. At the same time it is also true
that, economic growth itself is a panacea for environmental degradation. With
economic prosperity comes a nations willingness and ability to invest in and
care for environmental resources. How economic growth eects the environ-
ment is a debate that dates back to as early as the early 1970s. Meadows et al
(1972) published a report titled \The limits to Growth" where they concluded
that dierent natural resources would be depleted with economic growth and
even went as far as to predict possible depletion dates for them. Cole (1973)
vehemently criticized the report claiming that economic growth would bring
forward technological innovations that would relax the constraint on economic
resources. Thus while some economists focused on the constraint that economic
growth posed for natural resources, others saw economic growth as a mandatory
engine for the betterment of environmental quality.
Along the latter line of thought, in the early 1990s a group of economists
conducted empirical studies on a number of pollutants and came up with the
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conclusion that while the early stages of economic growth cause pollution to rise,
further economic growth causes pollution to go down (Grossman and Kreuger
(1991), Shak and Bandyopadhyay (1992), Panayotou (1993)). Such a pat-
tern in the income-pollution path was termed as the Environmental Kuznets
Curve (the EKC), named after Kuznets (1955) who observed a similar pattern
in income inequality and economic growth.With the advent of the EKC, several
studies to analyze the concept followed and is continuing till today. While some
studies were empirical, looking for the proof of the existence of the EKC on
dierent pollutants, others were more theoretical attempting to give structure
and hindsight behind the empirical evidence. A detailed summary of the dif-
ferent scope and work done in the area is included in the following section, the
literature review.
The discussion of the environmental quality, however, cannot be restricted
within the boundaries of a given nation - simply because no boundary can be
drawn upon the environment! To begin with, a lot of the resources of the
world are shared property - the maintenance of which require cooperation of all
parties involved. The ocean resources for example. Second, pollution generation
involves externalities. Thus pollution generated in one country can permeate
into the borders of the neighboring countries as well. Air pollution and water
pollution are common examples. Finally, actions of individual countries can
have an impact on the whole world. Example: global warming and climate
change. Thus, economists today realize that there exists a certain amount of
pollution interdependence among countries and a need to analyze the existence
of pollution externalities or global pollution.
Some work can be found on the topic in literature. For example, Andreoni
and Levinson (2001) develop a static model where they show that the existence
of the EKC can be explained by a simple technological relationship between the
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consumption of a desirable good and abatement of its undesirable bi-product.
They later expand their model to the multi-country case to account for pollution
externalities. They conclude that when pollution is sourced from consumption,
individual countries' optimal decision remain unchanged with the introduction
of externalities. Thus, in their model, Andreoni and Levinsion nd no distinc-
tion between the single-country and multi-country framework. On the contrary,
Gill et al (2017) write that the pattern of the EKC is more applicable to local
pollutants and not so much for transboundary pollutants. They therefore ar-
gue, that even though the advanced economies of today have followed the EKC
pattern in their growth process it is a dangerous route for the less developed
economies of today. If the developing countries of today continue to contribute
to the global pollution irreparable damages may be caused to the environment.
Developing countries of the world today should thus follow a plan other than
the one proposed by the EKC.
In this paper I build upon the discussion of transboundary pollution by in-
vestigating it in the presence of trade. In their analysis of The Environmental
Kuznets's Curve, Diamantoudi and Filippiadis (2012) propose a multi-country
model for the analysis of the existence of the EKC in the case of global pol-
lutants. The consideration of global pollutants, allows for capturing the in-
terdependence in countries' pollution decision thus posing the possibility of a
pollution game. They show that in the case of global pollutants there is a scope
for pollution substitution among countries. In this paper, I build upon their
model by introducing trade to the equation. The justication behind such an
extension is that trade too allows for interdependence in pollution decision. In
addition to capturing the negative impact of pollution externality (captured in
a model with global pollutant) trade allows for capturing the positive impact
through a wider range of consumption possibilities. I therefore argue that the
39
pollution/production decision of one country eects others in two ways: rst
a positive aect by allowing for a wider range of consumption possibilities and
second a negative eect through pollution generation and externality.
I have carried out a similar task in my rst paper, where I introduced trade
as an exogenous variable to the Andreoni and Levinson (2001) model. However,
the objective of the two exercises are distinctly dierent. In my rst paper the
objective was to assess if by engaging in trade the assumption of increasing re-
turns to abatement technology remains a necessary condition for the existence
of the EKC pattern in the income-pollution path of a country. In this paper
the focus is rather on the scope for pollution substitution. Thus by introduc-
ing trade, I assess the impact on the scope for pollution substitution, optimal
pollution and the shape of the EKC. By the way of the model is set up, IRS is
not a condition dictating the shape of the EKC in this case. For simplicity, in
this paper, I maintain that the abatement technology of the two countries are
homogeneous. I later relax this assumption in my third paper.
The discussion of international trade and the EKC is not new in literature.
In fact, in the past theories have been posed where international trade is one of
the factors causing the downward shift of the income-pollution path as proposed
by the EKC. For example, Arrow et al (1995) postulate that as economies grow,
they cease the production of certain dirty goods - the demand for which however
prevails. This demand is fullled by importing the dirty goods from the less
developed economies. Suri and Chapman (1998) suggested that as countries
grow, they transfer the dirty industries to the developed world. These models
are however limited to the discussion of local pollutants. There is not much
literature on EKC covering the role of international trade on transboundary or
global pollutants.
By introducing trade to the Diamantoudi and Filippiadis model, I also cre-
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ate a distinction between local pollutant and transboundary pollutant in the
model. The model developed by Diamantoudi and Fillipiadis (2012) focused
solely on the case of global pollutant as that was the avenue through which they
created interdependence across countries. By introducing trade to the model,
I have opened up a second scope of interdependence. I show that when trade
exists across nations, there is still a scope of pollution substitution even when
pollutants are local.
A point to note is that in the model, I have kept trade as exogenous to
the model. The reason for that is that the objective of the paper is not to
explain why or how much trade countries engage in. Rather the objective is
to observe how varying the degree of import and export aects the optimal
pollution decision and the income pollution path of a country. It also observes
how engaging in export and imports creates a scope for pollution substitution
among trading nations.
From the results, I nd that engaging in trade does create a scope for pollu-
tion substitution for global pollutants as well as for local pollutants. Engaging
in imports makes the scope for pollution substitution stronger. Engaging in
exports can also make the scope for pollution substitution stronger under cer-
tain circumstances. Also, higher the degree of pollution externality, higher will
be the scope for pollution substitution. For the impact on optimal pollution,
the model concludes that engaging in imports can allow a country to reduce its
optimal pollution. This, however, is true only for the case of local pollutants.
For transboundary pollutants, engaging in imports also increases optimal pollu-
tion levels. The inverted U shape in the pollution-income path can be retained
even after countries engage in trade for both local pollutants as well as global
pollutants. However, for the case of local pollutants, engaging in imports shifts
the EKC down, indicating that at every level of income, a country pollutes less
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while following the EKC pattern in their income pollution path. For the case
of global pollution, the EKC shifts upwards when countries engage in imports
and exports. For both local and transboundary pollution, the model nds that
when countries engage in exports, the turning point of EKC shifts outwards,
but the shape of the EKC is retained.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following order. Chapter 2.2 pro-
vides with the literature review. The model is presented in Chapter 2.3. The
comparative static analysis is conducted in Chapter 2.4. Chapter 2.5 presents
with a graphical display of the results found in Section 2.4. Finally Chapter 2.6
provides the conclusion.
2.2 Literature Review
Even though the discussion of the relationship between economic growth
and the environmental quality dates back a long time, the actual advent of
the concept of the EKC occurred in the early 1990s. The EKC traces out a
simple and pragmatic relationship between economic growth and environmental
quality, where it postulates that with the early stages of economic development
pollution rises and with further economic progress pollution eventually declines.
Such a relationship was rst proposed by Grossman and Kreuger(1991) in his
report on the potential impacts of the NAFTA and quickly strengthened by
Shak and Bandyopadhyay (1992) in their background study for the 1992 World
Development Report. A similar pattern among income inequality and per capita
income was observed and explained by Kuznets in 1955 who called it the Kuznets
Curve. In 1993, Panayoutou picked up on this idea and suxed the term with
`Environmental' to give rise to the term - the Environmental Kuznets Curve.
Initial work on the literature of EKC was largely empirical. Selden and Song
(1994) have conrmed the inverted U pattern in the income pollution path us-
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ing a cross-national panel of data on emission of four air pollutants namely
suspended particulate matter, sulfur di-oxide, oxides of nitrogen, and carbon
monoxide. However, they predicted emissions to decrease only in the very long
run with rapid growth of global emissions to continue for several decades. Gross-
man and Kreuger (1995) also examine the relationship between per capita GDP
and four environmental indicators and conclude in favor of the existence of the
EKC. They further provide with some economic intuition for such a pattern.
They explain that rst, with growth more stringent environmental policies are
adopted as with economic progress, non economic aspects of life such as a clean
environment become more desirable for economic agents. Second, as economies
grow they cease to produce some of the dirtier products and start to import them
instead. Finally, with time and learning from the experiences of the wealthier
countries, countries may adopt cleaner technologies.
Because of its pro-growth intuition and important policy implications the
EKC gained large popularity and much work has been done towards developing
models to explain the relationship. Arrow et al. (1995) pointed out that the
shape of the EKC can be explained by the natural progression of an economy
from clean agrarian society to polluting industrial economies to clean service
based economies. A lot of models have been developed to explain the shape
of the EKC with each making a set of assumptions. A rst group of models
exist that argue that economic development brings about changes in preferences
and with economic prosperity comes a rise in the demand for a clean environ-
ment. Example: Lopez (1994), John and Pecchenino (1994), Jaeger (1998).
Jeager(1998) shows that low levels of economic growth portray low levels of pol-
lution at which point consumers marginal benet to additional environmental
quality is zero. Therefore, at this stage, lower pollution does not lead to reduced
utility. However, with growth and increased pollution, consumers become sen-
43
sitive to increased pollution.
Another group of economists pointed out that with economic development
some constraints become non-binding, adoption of which lead to a decline in
the level of pollution. For example Stokey (1998) model that in the beginning
countries use the dirtiest technology. With economic development, when cleaner
technologies become economically feasible, adoption of cleaner technologies lead
to a decline in pollution. Lieb (2001) generalizes Stokey's model arguing that
satiation in consumption is needed to bring about the EKC.
The models discussed above are all single agent models. In reality pollu-
tion decisions often involve more than one country. Realizing this a group of
economists tried to explain the shape of the EKC through international trade.
Example Arrow et al. (1995), Suri and Chapman (1998) and Copeland and Tay-
lor (2001). The gist of argument in all these papers propose that with economic
development, dirty industries get relocated to the developing world. The views
presented in these papers are rather pessimistic or non sustainable in the sense
that as all the economies of the world grow, there won't remain a poor country
to turn to.On a more positive note Dean (1999) nd that trade liberalization di-
rectly aggravates environmental damage via its inuence on the terms of trade,
but indirectly mitigates it via its eect on income growth. Holladay (2008) look
at the impact of trade liberalization on the environment. He focuses on two
distinct sources of pollution - pollution from consumption and pollution from
production, and concludes that pollution from consumption increases where as
pollution from production decreases after trade liberalization.
Introduction of trade opens up one aspect of interdependence among coun-
tries in the sense that pollution can be substituted by transferring pollution
elsewhere. There still remains another important aspect of pollution - that of
externality. Seldom, pollution generated in one location is restricted to that
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location alone. Pollution often inltrates across boundaries thereby creating
another source of interdependence among countries. With advancement in the
literature of the EKC focus changed to incorporate transboundary pollution into
the discussion.Andreoni and Levinson (2001) develop a static model where they
show that the existence of the EKC can be explained by a simple technological
relationship between the consumption of a desirable good and abatement of its
undesirable bi-product. They later expand their model to the multi-country
case to account for pollution externalities. They conclude that when pollution
is sourced from consumption, individual countries' optimal decision remain un-
changed with the introduction of externalities. Thus, in their model, Andreoni
and Levinsion nd no distinction between the single-country and multi-country
framework. On the contrary, Gill et al (2017) write that the pattern of the
EKC is more applicable to local pollutants and not so much for transboundary
pollutants. They therefore argue, that even though the advanced economies of
today have followed the EKC pattern in their growth process it is a dangerous
route for the less developed economies of today. If the developing countries of
today continue to contribute to the global pollution irreparable damages may
be caused to the environment. Developing countries of the world today should
thus follow a plan other than the one proposed by the EKC. Diamantoudi and
Filippiadis (2010) extend upon the Stokey (1998) and Lieb (2004) model by
introducing global pollutants. In so doing, they bring into focus the possibility
of pollution substitution among countries. Filippiadis (2014) again extend upon
their work by introducing a dynamic setting to the multi-country model. He
questions the certainty of existence of the EKC pattern in the income pollution
path and argues that such as existence depends upon the initial stock of physical
capital and the total factor productivity of a country as well as the in between
interaction between the two countries.
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In summary, the models discussed do not conrm the existence of an EKC.
All the models give a set of parameters or restrictions within which the EKC
exists. In this paper I have thus selected an existing model that successfully
traces the existence of the EKC under a rich set of parameters and then see
how the model predictions change when introducing trade to the discussion.
Two forms of inter-country interdependence has been identied in the literature
of the EKC. One in the form of trade, and another in the form of pollution
externality. However, the two interdependencies together is yet to be investi-
gated. By introducing trade to the Diamantoudi and Filippiadis (2010) model,
I bring the distinct discussion of interdependency through pollution externality
and that of trade under one umbrella.
2.3 The Model
Analyzing the impact of trade in an n country framework is complicated.
To maintain the tractability and analytical clarity of the model, I limit my
discussion to a two country case. I assume there are two countries,i 2 f1; 2g each
producing a single commodity. Each country retains a fraction of its production
for own consumption i for i = 1; 2, and exports the rest to the other country.
The goods produced in each country generates pollution xi as a bi-product of
the production process. For each country i a social utility function is linearly
separable in consumption and pollution and is given by:
Vi = ui(c1; c2)  hi(l1x1 + l2x2) (1)
where ui is a country specic utility function, twice continuously dieren-
tiable, that is increasing and concave in consumption c1 and c2:hi is also twice
continuously dierentiable, convex and rising x1 and x2 and captures the nega-
tive utility of each country associated with pollution. The term li 2 f0; 1g cap-
tures the extent of pollution that Country i is exposed to. For the own country
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the value of li will always be 1 as the pollution generated in own country will
aect the country in question. For the foreign country, the value assigned to
li can be 0 or 1. A value of 0 means that the pollution generated in the other
country is local and a value of 1 would mean that pollution generated in the
other country is global.






i ; ifci  1
1
2; otherwise
with  > 0: is the risk aversion indicator. The higher the value of  the
more risk averse a country is.
hi =

2 (x1 + l2x2)
2
with  2 R+ is a scale parameter capturing how pollution is perceived by
country i:
Output in country i is represented by the following production function:
qi = yi(xi) = yi
xi
xi
where yi is the potential output of country i when the dirtiest technology is
used. (xi) is a technology index that converts potential output in to quantities
ready for consumption. xi is the maximum pollution of a given country. The
assumption in the model is that pollution is bounded from above by xi. xi is
the level of pollution generated by country i when producing quantity qi:Clearly,
the maximum value that (:) can take is 1, that is the current level of pollution
is at the maximum permissible level, and therefore yi is the potential output
when the dirtiest technology is used. Let the upper bound to pollution be an
increasing function of income such that:
xi = y

i ;  2 (0; 1)
yi represents the technology relating to the abatement of pollution. The
higher the level of technology, the lower will be the value of . One can even
view this as a policy parameter where a country with more strict environmental
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regulations will maintain a lower value of :
So far the model set up is quite similar to that developed by Diamantoudi
and Filippiadis (2012). As a point of departure I introduce trade to the model.
As explained earlier, each country retains a fraction of the output qi for its own
consumption and exports the rest to the foreign country. Given that i captures
the fraction of own output that each country retains for itself, the consumption




+ (1  2)y2 x2y2 for Country 1, and




Under such a framework the maximization problem faced by the social plan-










2  2 (x1+l2x2)2 (2)
The rst order derivative of equation (2) above gives the optimal pollution


















1  y1 (21 y2 21 +)
l2+1(1 2)y1 1 y1 2
Pollution decision of Country i = 1 depends upon own income and param-
eters as well as the income and pollution decision of Country i = 2, and the
degree of trade. In the following sections the implications of each of them are
investigated more closely.
Proposition 4 When countries do not engage in trade the nature of interde-
pendency among pollutants can be captured only for the case of global pollutants.
Introducing trade into the model allows for capture of pollution interdependence
for the case of local pollutants as well as global pollutants. Engaging in imports
makes the scope for pollutions substitution stronger. Engaging in exports makes
the scope for pollution substitution strong under specic conditions.
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Proof. To assess the scope for pollution substitutability I take the derivative









The negative sign in the derivative suggests that there is scope for pollution
substitution between nations. Note that absent trade, i.e 1 = 1 and 2 = 1, a
scope for pollution substitution exists only when there is global pollution (l2 = 1).
But when countries do engage in trade, (0 < 1; 2 < 1) there is a scope for
pollution substitution between trading nations even when the nature of pollutants
is strictly local (i.e, l = 0).
I now investigate the impact of trade on the degree of pollution substitution.












Thus the larger fraction of output of Country 2 that Country 1 imports, the
stronger the scope of pollution substitution. Intuitively, rather than producing
goods at home, if a country wishes to engage in imports, (the production of which
generate pollution) , the level of pollution at the home country can be reduced.
This conclusion holds for both the case of local pollutants as well as for global
pollutants. Also, the higher the income of the foreign country, stronger will be the
scope of pollution substitution through imports. Finally the higher the pollution
perception at home, the weaker will be the scope of pollution substitution through
imports.
The impact of exports on the possibility of pollution substitution is however












When the value to equation (6) is positive, it means that the lower the value
of 1 (the higher the value of (1  1), the stronger will be the scope for pollution
49
substitution. This will be true for the following conditions.







Thus when pollutants are local, the higher the income of Country1, engaging
in export will make the scope of pollution substitution stronger.
When pollutants are global (l2 = 1) the following conditions ensure the pos-









When the condition above is not satised, equation (6) will take a negative
value, meaning that the more Country 1 engages in exports, the weaker will be
the scope for pollution substitution through exports








< 0 meaning that the higher the
degree of pollution externality of Country 2, the stronger is the scope for pol-
lution substitution. The higher the income of the foreign country, the stronger
will be the scope of pollution substitution.
2.4 Comparative Statics
2.4.1 The Symmetric Case
Suppose the two countries are identical with respect to income as well as
other parameters. Note that under such a circumstance, the justication for
engaging in trade becomes weak. However, such an exercise is necessary to
set the benchmark and thereby make further investigations (for example the
asymmetric case) more tractable. One can think of this as a case where there
are two countries, similar in income and other parameters, but producing two
dierent commodities. The justication of trade in this case lies in the appeal to
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increase the composition of consumption possibilities. Given that, the optimal




where x = xi . So long as the optimal pollution x
 < x, the optimal
pollution-income path follows the inverted U-shape where8><>:
@x




@y < 0; otherwise:
(8)




Trade clearly has an impact on the turning point of the EKC.
@yTP
@1
=  (  12 2)( (21+(1 2)2 )(1(1+(1 2))2 )(  12 2 1) < 0 (9)
Thus the higher the value of 1 (the lower the level of exports), the earlier
will be the turning point of income. Engaging in exports, will therefore push
the turning point of income outwards. This may not be entirely undesirable.
For even though, the turning point occurs at a higher level of income, engaging
in exports expedites income growth and may thus allow for the opportunity to















(  12 2 1) < 0 (10)
The higher the fraction of output imported, the lower will be the turning
point. By engaging in imports, countries can bring the turning point of EKC for-
ward. Thus it shows, that the shape of the EKC is retained even after countries
engage in international trade. Engaging in imports will also reduce the optimal
level of pollution as @x@(1 f) < 0: Thus when countries engage in international
trade, a combination of imports and exports will bring forth a desirable impact
on the EKC of the country.
Note that the shape of the EKC is retained both in the case of local pollutants
(l = 0) and when there exists pollution externalities (l > 0). However for the
case of transboundary pollutants, engaging in imports will bring forward the
turning point faster than the case of local pollutants.
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Clearly @x@ < 0and
@x
@ < 0 stating that the more risk averse the agents of
a country are and the higher the perception of pollution is respectively, the
optimal level of pollution will go down.
2.4.2 The Asymmetric Case
I now check the model for the asymmetric case. As a starting point, I main-
tain asymmetry with respect to income . I now look at the case where there
are two countries each having a dierent level of income. I also state that the
pollution generated in the two countries can vary, i.e they can either be local or
global. To maintain the tractability of the model, I maintain that the model is
symmetric with respect to all other parameters, i.e,  representing technology,
 representing the degree of risk averseness, and  capturing perception of pol-
lution. As the technology of the two countries are assumed similar, I maintain
that pollution will either be local or global. In either case l1 = l2. Solving the
model in this manner gives the following optimal pollution for country 1:
x1 =
8>>>><>>>>:















; ify2 <  
y1 > ; andy2 >  










When y1 < ,optimal pollution is zero. This is because the domestic country
is so poor that they are not able to engage in modern production of pollution.
The same is true for the case of the foreign country when their income is below
the thresh hold level. In the equation above,  and  are the thresh hold of
income of Country 1 and Country 2 respectively. Below the threshold it is not
possible for a country to engage in modern production/pollution. Note that in
either of these cases, countries will obviously not engage in trade, and at the
interior the optimal pollution decision for domestic country will be 0 when it is
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the poor country and y1 1 when Country 2 is the poor country.
At the interior, the optimal pollution holds dierent implications for local
pollutants and transboundary pollutants. The following sections interprets each
of the scenarios separately.
2.4.2.1 The Case of Local Pollutants
In this section I look at the impact of trade on the optimal level of pollution
and the shape of the income-pollution path when pollutants are strictly local.
Proposition 5 Engaging in import can enable Country 1 to reduce the level




2 2 ;and (1   2) < 3=4.
However, if Country 1 is to maintain the EKC pattern in the income pollution
path, engaging in exports will raise the optimal level of pollution.
Proof. When the pollutant generated in both countries are strictly local, the














In order to look at the impact of trade on the optimal level of pollution, I




B(1(42 1)y1 1 y2 22 ) A(22y2 22  (1 212 21 )y2 21 y2 22 )
B2 (12)
If Country 1 wishes to reduce optimal pollution through increasing the frac-
tion of output of Country 2 imported, equation (12) must be positive. A positive
value indicates that as 2 goes down, (1   2) goes up, and the optimal level
of pollution goes down. Since x1 > 0 it must mean that A > 0 and B > 0.
Therefore the derivative will be positive for (1(42   1)y1 1 y2 22 )  0 and
(22y
2 2
2   (1   212   21 )y2 21 y2 22 )  0. These conditions are met
when (1   2)  3=4 and y1 > ( 221(1 22 1) )
1
2 2 :When these conditions are
not met, the derivative above can take a negative value indicating that increas-
ing the fraction of output of Country 2 imported will raise the optimal level of
pollution.
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Next, I look at the impact of export on the optimal level of pollution. The




B(y1 1 +2(22 1)y1 1 y2 22 )
B2
 A(21y2 21 +(22t+22 2)y2 21 y2 22 )B2 (13)
Again, a positive value of equation (13) would indicated that reducing the
fraction of 1 and thus raising the share of (1   1) will raise the share of op-
timal pollution. This is possible when y1 1 + 2(22   1)y1 1 y2 22  0 and
21y
2 2
1 + (212 + 
2
2   2)y2 21 y2 22  0. These set of inequalities are
met when ( 2(1 22) )
1
2 2  y2  ( 21(2 212 22 ) )
1
2 2 . Such a restriction on
y2 will hold so long as 1  1=4. For larger value of 1 the restriction will become
weaker, meaning that engaging in export will in fact raise the level of optimal
pollution. Thus the set of conditions under which engaging in export can reduce
the level of optimal pollution is quite tight.
Next I turn to the discussion on the shape of the income pollution path. The
path will follow the desired inverted U pattern, only if
@2x1
@y21
< 0. The derivation
is quite complex and is included in the Appendix. but the set of conditions that




2 2with (1   2) > 1=2: Thus we
see that the condition conicts with the condition set to ensure the positivity of
the derivative of optimal pollution with respect to 1:
I therefore conclude that when countries engage in trade in a way so that the
inverted U pattern of the EKC is retained, engaging in import can reduce the
optimal level of pollution, but engaging in export will raise it.
The conclusions of Proposition 5 are in line with the conclusions of the
ndings of the symmetric analysis. In the symmetric analysis we found that
import is likely to reduce the optimal level of pollution and bring forward the
turning point of income. Export is likely to push the turning point outward. For
the case of local pollutants, I also nd that it is possible to substitute optimal
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pollution by engaging in imports. The case for exports is a bit more complicated.
Under the conditions specied, engaging in exports will raise the optimal level
of pollution. However, overall, after engaging in trade the desired EKC pattern
is retained when pollutants generated in both countries are strictly local.
2.4.2.2 The Case of Global Pollutants
I now turn focus on the impact of trade when the nature of pollutants are
global. When both countries emit pollutants that are global, the optimal pol-















Since the optimal level of pollution is positive, it must mean that C > 0 and
D > 0. However, in this case, the impact of import and export on the optimal
level of trade and the shape of the income pollution path become less straight
forward.
Proposition 6 Even though the shape of the EKC can be retained when coun-
tries engage in trade, the impact of import and export on the optimal level of
pollution will be positive. That is, engaging in import and export may result
in higher levels of pollution even though the shape of the income pollution path
follows the inverted U pattern.
Proof. For the shape of the income pollution path to follow the inverted U pat-
ten, the second derivative of optimal pollution with respect to income must
be negative. This condition is satised if the following restrictions are met.












2 2 . The second set of
condition is on the level of trade. Compared to local pollutants, in the case of
global pollutants (1  2) should be less than 1=2 in order to maintain the shape
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of the EKC. Also (1 1) > 2 with 1 < 222 1 . Another additional requirement
is that the value of  should be less than 1/2. This means that the level of tech-
nology should be relatively more advanced if trade among countries is to ensure
the shape of the EKC. A detailed workout of the second derivative of optimal
pollution with respect to income is included in Appendix.
Next I analyze how engaging in import will aect the optimal level of pollu-




D[ y1 2  1(42 1)y1 1 y2 22 ]
D2
 C[22y2 22 +(21 1)y1 1 y1 2 +(212+21 1)y2 21 y2 22 ]D2 (15)
For engagement in import to reduce the level of optimal pollution, equation
(15) should be positive. This will happen when y1  ( 12(22 1)y1 2 )
1
1  and






1  . Comparing this to the set of restrictions
previously set for the EKC pattern of the income pollution path, we see that
these set of restrictions violate the ones previously set.Therefore, when countries
engage in imports in ways that ensures the EKC pattern of the income pollution
path, engaging in import will raise the optimal level of pollution.
How engaging in exports will aect the optimal level of pollution is given by




D[y1 1 +2(22 1)y1 1 y2 22 ]
D2
 C[21y2 21 +(22 1)y1 1 y1 2 +22(1 2)y2 21 y2 22 ]D2 (16)






1  and y2  ( 2(1 22) )
1
2 2 :. Again the condition
placed upon the income of Country 2 that ensures the shape of EKC is violated
if we seek for positivity of equation (16).
I therefore conclude that for the case of transboundary pollutants, even though
engaging in trade will still retain the shape of the EKC in the income pollution
path, it will likely raise the level of optimal pollution.
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From the conclusions of the asymmetric case, Proposition 4 and Proposition
5, I conclude that engaging in trade will retain the shape of the EKC even
though the turning point may get aected. However, the impact of trade is
more favorable for the case of local pollutants than for transboundary pollutants.
For the local pollutants the shape of the EKC is retained. At the same time,
engaging in imports can reduce the level of optimal pollution although, engaging
in export is likely to raise it. For the case of transboundary pollutants, I nd that
even though the shape of the EKC is retained after engaging in trade, engaging
in imports and exports both are likely to raise the optimal level of pollution.
Therefore, even though countries face the prospect of reduced pollution with
economic growth, they do it with the risk of higher pollution at any given level
of income when they engage in trade.
2.5 Demonstration of Results
Section 2.4 chalks out the impact of trade on the optimal level of pollution as
well as on the income pollution path of a country when pollution is local and for
when it is global. In this section I carry out a simple simulation exercise to give
a graphic representation to the claims of Proposition 5 and 6. The parameter
values are selected as per the conditions set up by the model, the relative income
of the two countries are set on the basis of the boundaries set by the proposition.
The parametric restrictions set by the models are:  2 (0; 1);   0; and
 2 R+. Just for a quick recap,  is a parameter capturing the level of abatement
technology. The lower the value of , better is the abatement technology. 
measures the risk averseness of agents, with higher values of  signifying more
risk averse individuals. Finally  measures the pollution perception with higher
values of  indicating a higher degree of dislike for pollution. For the simulation
exercise, the parameter values that I consider are:  = 0:5;  = 2;  = 3. The
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value for  is deliberately selected to measure a country with average technology.
It is assumed that the agents are risk averse, and the pollution perception is
quite high. With this framework, I proceed to look at the simulation results.
First I look at the impact of import and export on the optimal level of
pollution when pollution is local as well as when pollution is global.
Table 2.1 : Impact of Import and Export on the Optimal Level of Pollution
Local Pollution Global Pollution
Impact of Import
Impact of Export
Table 2.1 above showcases the claims made in Proposition 5 and 6 on the
impact of export and import on the optimal level of trade. The graphs above
are based on simulated values. The chosen parameter values are already stated
above. The values assigned to y1 and y2 are 3 and 1 respectively. Again these
values are within the ranged specied by proposition 5 and 6.
In proposition 5 we see that for the case of local pollutants engaging in
import will reduced optimal pollution as long as (1   2) < 3=4: The graph
above shows that engaging in import is declining the optimal level of pollution
when the level of import is lower. It is also claimed that engaging in export
will reduce the optimal level of pollution so long as 1  1=4. Again in the
graph above it is shown that when the value of 1 is relatively high, engaging in
export is increasing the optimal level of pollution. The optimal level of pollution
is going down with higher values of export or lower values of 1: Thus it is shown
that the claims made in proposition 2 hold for this set of simulation exercise.
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Proposition 6 claims that when the income of the two countries are within a
certain range, engaging in trade will increase the optimal level of pollution even
though the shape of the EKC will be maintained. The rst part of the claim is
shown in Table 2.1 above where it can be seen that engaging in both exports
and imports increases the optimal level of pollution. How trade will aect the
shape of the income pollution path is demonstrated in Table 2.2 below.
Table 2.2: Impact of Trade on the Income-Pollution Path
Local Pollution Global Pollution
No Trade
With Trade
Table 2.2 above shows the impact of trade on the shape of the income pollu-
tion path for both the case of local pollutants as well as for global pollutants. All
of the claims made in Proposition 5 and 6 are conrmed through this simulation
exercise. First of all, whether the nature of pollutant is local or global, engaging
in trade allows for the income pollution path to follow the desired EKC pattern.
Second, for the case of local pollutants, the shape of the EKC is retained at
lower levels of pollution when countries engage in trade. For the case of global
pollutants, the shape of the EKC is retained after trade, but it is so at the cost
of higher levels of pollution.Engaging trade therefore is benecial for the income




The concept of EKC draws out a pragmatic relationship between pollution
and per capita income that poses critical guidelines for policy developments.
Even though a lot of work has been done in literature, the existence of the EKC
remains doubtful. Most models that successfully draw out the existence of an
EKC, do so under set of parametric restrictions. In order to see the impact of
trade on the existence of EKC, in this paper, I have chosen a model that sets out
the existence of EKC under a rich set of parameters, and introduced trade to
the picture. Trade plays an important role in the discourse of economic growth
and environmental quality. To begin with, trade allows agents with a wider
range of consumption possibilities. Also, trade allows for a scope for pollution
substitution through imports. Finally, when the nature of pollutants are global,
interdependence among countries with respect to pollution generation increase
when trade is brought into the equation.
The Diamantoudi and Filippiadis (2012) model that I have chosen develop a
model for global pollution in order to capture the nature of interdependence in
pollution decision of countries. When introducing trade, the rst conclusion I
reach is that trade too allows for pollution interdependence when the nature of
pollutants are global as well as when they are strictly local. The model concludes
that engaging in imports makes the scope for pollution substitution stronger.
Engaging in exports can also enhance the scope of pollution substitution under
a certain set of circumstances.
Having introduced trade, the model has been solved for both the symmetric
case as well as the asymmetric case. For the symmetric case, it is found that
the shape of the EKC is retained even after introducing trade. While exports
push the turning point of the EKC outwards, engaging in imports can bring
forward the turning point. In addition, engaging in imports reduces the level
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of optimal pollution. Engaging in trade therefore has an overall desirable aect
on the income pollution path.
The asymmetric analysis is carried on with respect to asymmetry in income
only. The exercise is done in two parts. For the case of local pollution, it is found
that when the income of a Country is more than a certain threshold, engaging in
imports can reduce the optimal level of pollution. Also, when conducting trade
with a second country whose income is within a certain range, the shape of the
EKC in the income pollution path is retained. However, when income of the
two countries are within the boundaries set, engaging in exports is likely to raise
the optimal level of pollution. This conclusion is in line with the conclusions
found for the symmetric analysis.
For the case of global pollutants, the ndings are a bit dierent. Again it is
found that when income of the two countries are within a set range, engaging
in trade can still retain the shape of the EKC. However, these conditions imply
that engaging in import and export is likely to raise the optimal level of pollu-
tion. Therefore, the model concludes that even though the shape of the EKC
is retained after engaging in trade, for the case of global pollutants, it is likely
to happen at a higher levels of pollution. The paper therefore concludes that
trade holds benecial implications more for the case of local pollutants than for
the case of global pollutants. Trade allows for pollution substitution. When
pollutants are local, engaging in trade retains the shape of the EKC in the in-
come pollution path. When the impact of import is greater than the impact of
export, engaging in trade can allow countries to obtain the EKC pattern with
lower levels of pollution at every level. When pollutants are global, engaging




Appendix A. Derivation of the Model Solution.











2  2 (x1+l2x2)2 (1)










1   (x1 + l2x2) = 0























) x2  1y
1 
1  y1 (21 y2 21 +)
l2+1(1 2)y1 1 y1 2
Solving the model for Country 2 in the same way yields the optimal level of













Substituting the value of x2 in equation (2), at the interior, the optimal











2 +(212 1 2)y1 1 y1 2 +2(122+21 2 12)y2 21 y2 22
This is the solution where l1 = l2 = 1 and hence the solution for global
pollutant.
For local pollutant, the model is solved in the same manner except l1 = l2 =













Appendix B. Proof of Propositions
B1. Proof of Proposition 2
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To see the impact on optimal pollution with respect to import, the derivative




B(1(42 1)y1 1 y2 22 ) A(22y2 22  (1 212 21 )y2 21 y2 22 )
B2
If engaging in import reduces the level of optimal pollution, the derivative
above should take a positive value. Since pollution is positive it must be that
A > 0and B > 0. Thus for the derivative to be positive it is sucient to have
the following conditions:
(1(42   1)y1 1 y2 22 )  0) (1  2)  3=4 and,
22y
2 2
2   (1   212   21 )y2 21 y2 22 ) y1 > ( 221(1 22 1) )
1
2 2 .
To see the impact on optimal pollution with respect to export we take the
derivative of optimal pollution with respect to t and get:
@x1
@t =
B(y1 1 +2(22 1)y1 1 y2 22 ) A(21y2 21 +(212+22 2)y2 21 y2 22 )
B2
Again, in order to see the conditions that will allow engaging in export to
reduce optimal pollution, the derivative above must be positive. This is possible
under the following conditions:






) ( 2(1 22) )
1
2 2  y2  ( 21(2 212 22 ) )
1
2 2 with 1  1=4.
Finally I need to nd the conditions that ensure that the pollution income
path follows the EKC pattern.














I want to see how trade among countries with dierent income aect the
shape of the income pollution path. In order to get the desired EKC pattern,
the second order derivative of optimal pollution with respect to income must be
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I now set out some set of conditions that is sucient to prove the negativity
of the second order derivative. Before that, I write the equation above in a
simpler format.
Let; 12(22   1)y1 1 y2 22 + 1y1 1 = [1]
(1  )12(22   1)y 1 y2 22 + (1  )1y 1 = [2a]
2(2  2)12(1 + 2   1)y1 21 y2 22 + (2  2)21 y1 21 = [2b]
12(22   1)y1 1 y2 22 + 1y1 1 = [3a]
2(1 2)(2 2)12(1+2 1)y 21 y2 22 +(1 2)(2 2)21 y 21 = [3b]
 (1  )12(22   1)y  11 y2 22   (1  )1y 1 1 = [4]





B3   2[2a][2b]B2   [3a][3b]B2 + [4]B
Therefore, if I can nd the set of conditions for which [1],[2a],[2b],[3a],[3b]and[4] <
0, then the second derivative of optimal pollution with respect to income will
be negative. In other words, these set of conditions will ensure that the shape
of the EKC is maintained in the income-pollution path.
Condition1
12(22   1)y1 1 y2 22 + 1y1 1 < 0
) y2 > ( 2(1 22) )
1
2 2




2 2 . If the income of Country 2 is lower, Country 1 should reduce
the level of (1   2)and therefore increase 2 to maintain the inequality. Also,
2 < 1=2.
Condition 2a
(1  )12(22   1)y 1 y2 22 + (1  )1y 1 < 0
Notice that Condition 2a is the rst derivative of Condition 1a with respect
to y1:Therefore the same conditions that were applicable in Condition 1 will be
applicable here to keep Condition 2a negative.
Condition 2b
2(2  2)12(1 + 2   1)y1 21 y2 22 + (2  2)21 y1 21 < 0
) y2 > ( 12(1 1 2) )
1
2 2with 1 < (1  2)
For the inequality to hold, the income of country 2 must be bigger and the
fraction of goods retained at home must be less than the fraction of country 2's
output imported.
When the income of Country 2 is low, 1 should be reduced or (1 1) raised
to maintain the inequality.
Condition 3a
12(22   1)y1 1 y2 22 + 1y1 1 < 0
Condition 3a is the same as condition 1 and therefore already proved nega-
tive.
Condition 4
 (1  )12(22   1)y  11 y2 22   (1  )1y 1 1 < 0
Same as 1
In summary, the conditions that ensures the negativity of the second deriva-





2 2with (1  2) > 1=2:
Thus we see that the condition conicts with the condition set to ensure the
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positivity of the derivative of optimal pollution with respect to 1:









2 2 with 3=4 > (1  2) > 1=2:engaging in import will reduce
the level of pollution, engaging in export will raise the level of pollution, and
the shape of the income pollution path will follow the EKC pattern.
B2. Proof of Proposition 3
















In order to nd the set of conditions that ensure that engaging in import
will lead to reduced optimal pollution, I take the derivative of optimal global




D[ y1 2  1(42 1)y1 1 y2 22 ] C[22y2 22 +(21 1)y1 1 y1 2 +(212+21 1)y2 21 y2 22 ]
D2 >
0
Since pollution is positive it implies that C > 0 and D > 0: Thus sucient
condition for positivity of the derivative above is given by:












To nd the set of conditions that will ensure that engaging in exports will
reduce the optimal level of pollution, I take the derivative of optimal pollution




D[y1 1 +2(22 1)y1 1 y2 22 ] C[21y2 21 +(22 1)y1 1 y1 2 +22(1 2)y2 21 y2 22 ]
D2 >
0


















Finally I try to nd the set of conditions that will guarantee that the income
pollution path will follow the EKC pattern.
In this section I look at the implications for the income pollution path when
countries with dierent levels of income trade with each other when the nature
of pollutants is global. The solution that I got for optimal pollution for the case















In order to obtain the desired inverted U relationship, the second order
derivative to the optimal pollution function with respect to income must be












2 +(212 1 2)y1 1 y1 2 +2(21 2+122 12)y2 21 y2 22 )3

(2(2  2)(21 2 + 122   12)y1 21 y2 22
+21 y
1 2
1 + (1  )(212   1   2)y 1 y1 2 )2







2 +(212 1 2)y1 1 y1 2 +2(21 2+122 12)y2 21 y2 22 )2

(2(2  2)(21 2 + 122   12)y1 21 y2 22
+(2  2)21 y1 21 + (1  )(212   1   2)y 1 y1 2 )







2 +(212 1 2)y1 1 y1 2 +2(21 2+122 12)y2 21 y2 22 )2

(2(1  2)(2  2)(21 2 + 122   12)y 21 y2 22









2 +(212 1 2)y1 1 y1 2 +2(21 2+122 12)y2 21 y2 22 )
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Again I group the second derivative above to get some tractability.
Let:
(12(22   1)y2 22 y1 1   2y1 2 + 1y1 1 ) = [1]
((1  )12(22   1)y 1 y2 22 + (1  )1y 1 = [2a]
(2(2  2)(21 2 + 122   12)y1 21 y2 22 + (2  2)21 y1 21 + (1 
)(212   1   2)y 1 y1 2 ) = [2b]
((12(22   1)y1 1 y2 22 + 1y1 1   2y1 2 ) = [3a]
(2(1  2)(2  2)(21 2 + 122   12)y 21 y2 22 + (1  2)21 y 21  
(1  )(212   1   2)y1 1 y1 2 )) = [3b]
 (1  )12(22   1)y 1 1 y2 22   1(1  )y 1 1 = [4]





D3   2[2a][2b]D2   [3a][3b]D2 + [4]D
Therefore if I can show that [1],[2a],[2b],[3a],[3b] and [4]<0 then the second
order condition will be negative. The sucient conditions to ensure the
negativity of the second order condition are listed below.
Condition 1
12(22   1)y2 22 y1 1   2y1 2 + 1y1 1 < 0






1  with (1  2) < 1=2
For the case of transboundary pollution, the fraction of import is reduced and
the poorer the country 1 inequality can be maintained by reducing 1.
Condition 2a
(1  )12(22   1)y 1 y2 22 + (1  )1y 1 < 0
) y2 > ( 2(1 22) )
1
2 2
This implies that Country 1 should engage in trade with a country whose
income is satised by the inequality above. Note that in this case to maintain
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the positivity of the RHS, 2 should be less than 1/2 which contradicts with
Condition 1. However, this is a weak restriction and can be overwritten by
Condition 1 which is a stronger restriction.
Condition 2b
(2(2  2)(21 2 + 122   12)y1 21 y2 22 + (2  2)21 y1 21 + (1 
)(212   1   2)y 1 y1 2 ) < 0
) (1  1) > 2 and 1 < 222 1 with 2 > 1=2
@(1=(22   1))=@2 < 0. This means the lower the value of 2 the stronger the
inequality.
Condition 3a
12(22   1)y1 1 y2 22 + 1y1 1   2y1 2 < 0
Same as Condition 1 so already proved.
Condition3b
(2(1  2)(2  2)(21 2 + 122   12)y 21 y2 22
+(1  2)(2  2)21 y 21   (1  (212   1   2)y1 1 y1 2 )) < 0
this is just the rst order derivative of Condition 2b with respect to y1.
Therefore, the same set of conditions apply here with the additional one that
is  < 1=2:
Condition 4
 (1  )12(22   1)y 1 1 y2 22   1(1  )y 1 1
Same as condition 2a. Therefore the same conditions apply.
In summary the set of conditions that will ensure the negativity of the second












2 2 , (1  2) < 1=2,
(1  1) > 2 and 1 < 2222 1 nally  < 1=2:
Comparing the conditions on income for the shape of EKC with the conditions
for positivity of the derivatives with respect to 1 and 2 it is obvious that the
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conditions contradict each other. Therefore, when countries engage in trade in
ways that the EKC is maintained, the level of global pollution will rise.
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Essay 3: Revisiting \The Environmental
Kuznets Curve in a Multi-Country
Setting" in the presence of Trade - the
case of heterogeneous technology
3.1 Introduction
Study of the Environmental Kuznets Curve links two important determinants
that are pivotal for social welfare. They are economic growth and
environmental quality. The EKC postulates that even though the
environmental quality deteriorates with the early stages of economic
development, it improves with further economic progress. The existence of
such a relationship between economic growth and the environment holds
signicant policy relevance and has received much attention both in empirical
studies and theoretical analysis since its initiation in the early 1990s.
A review of the theoretical models explaining the shape of EKC reveal four
broad avenues through which economic development eventually lead to a
decline in pollution. A rst group of models propose that the income elasticity
of a clean environment is greater than one and therefore, with a rise in income,
the demand for a clean environment rises which leads to investments towards
cleaning up the environment more desirable. Examples of this kind of models
include John and Pecchenino(1994), Jaeger (1998). Both of these models
propose that early stages of economic development the environment is
relatively clean and therefore there is no demand for investments in the
environment. With economic growth, when the environment becomes
suciently dirty, there is a demand for investment in the environment. The
rst model diers from the second in the way that the rst is an overlapping
generation model .
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A second group of economists posit that at low levels of income some aspects
are binding and thus not available to agents. With economic prosperity those
aspects become non binding and thus enable economies to avail those aspects
and reduce pollution. The work of Stokey (1998) and Jones and Manuelli
(1995) fall under this line of explanation.Stokey (1998) proposes that at the
early stages of economic development only the dirtiest technology is used, and
so pollution rises with income. With economic development clean technology
becomes economically feasible and so pollution starts to go down.
Third, another group of economists have modeled net pollution as a function
of gross pollution and abatement eorts. For example Andreoni and Levinson
(2001) and Smulders and Bretschger (2001). Andreoni and Levinson (2001)
developed a static model in which the income pollution path could be
explained by a simple relationship between consumption of a desirable good
and abatement of its undesirable bi-product. They showed that net pollution
is a function of gross pollution and abatement technology and that the
pollution income path followed an inverted U pattern only when the
abatement technology displayed increasing returns to scale. Around the same
time, Smulders and Brestschger (2001) show that high levels of pollution
induces policy intervention that encourages adaptation of better technology
which causes a downward shift in the income pollution path.
Finally, a fourth group of economists have attributed the existence of the EKC
to international trade. For example, Arrow et al. (1995) and Suri and
Chapman (1998) explain that with economic development the dirty industries
get relocated to the developing world and thereby reduce pollution in the
developed economies.
In all the models mentioned above, the discussion of \technology" is explicitly
or implicitly embedded. Technology clearly plays a key role in both the
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creation of as well as the mitigation of pollution.Thus in this paper, I would
like to expand upon the discourse of technology with the presence of trade.
This paper looks at the impact of trade on the possibility of pollution
substitution, optimal level of pollution and the shape of the EKC when
countries with dierent technologies trade with each other. I have conducted a
similar exercise in my rst paper where I have introduced trade and
heterogeneity in technology to the Androni and Levinson (2001) model.
However, in my rst paper the focus of the discussion was centered upon the
nature of scale of abatement technology and concluded that when countries
engage in trade with each other, increasing returns to abatement technology
no longer remains a necessary condition to achieve the EKC pattern in
income-pollution path.
In my second paper I introduced trade to the multi-country model developed
by Diamantoudi and Filippiadis (2012) and concluded that the exercise allows
for a scope of pollution substitution in the case of global pollutants as well as
local pollutants. I solved the model for both the symmetric case and
asymmetric case where the asymmetry was with respect to income. In this
paper I wish to introduce heterogeneity to technology. Holding income equal
for the two countries, I consider distinctive technology parameters for the two
countries to see how in this environment trade aects the optimal level of a
countries' pollution and the shape of the EKC. By the way the model is set
up, the assumption to the return to scale of technology is set to be decreasing.
I further hold that pollution generated in each country can vary with respect
to the intensity of externality. The externality to pollution can vary between 0
and 1, where 0 implies that pollution generated is completely local (the case of
local pollution) and a value in between 0 and 1 suggests that part of the
pollution generated permeates across the boundaries of the country (the case
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of transboundary pollution). However, the intensity of pollution goes down
compared to the source of generation, perhaps due to distance. When the
pollution externality takes a value of 1, it means that all of the pollution
generated permeates across the borders. Such a case can be looked at as the
case of global pollution. A point to note is that in the second paper, because I
held homogeneous technology parameters, the model considered that the
pollution generated was either local, or global and same for both countries. In
this paper, with heterogeneity in technology, the assumption is that the
pollution generated may either be local, or transboundary or global and may
vary across countries. That is, while pollution of one country can be local, the
pollution generated by the other country can be transboundary or even global.
The original model already established the existence of the EKC. My second
paper looked at the impact of trade on the shape of the EKC when countries
varied with respect to income. This paper looks at the impact of trade among
countries with varying degrees of technology. It shows that the relative level of
the two countries holds implications for the direction of trade. Again, like my
other papers, trade has been kept exogenous to the model so that the impact
of import and export could be assessed by varying their intensities.
Results of this paper reveal that the better the technology of the foreign
country, engaging in import makes the possibility of pollution substitution
stronger. With a rise in technology of home country engaging in exports leads
to stronger pollution substitution. Second, when both countries emit local
pollutants, the optimal level of pollution is lower than when either or both of
them emit transboundary or global pollutants. When the technology of the
foreign country is better, importing a larger fraction of foreign output reduces
optimal pollution and when the technology of the home country is high,
exporting a larger fraction of domestically produced goods reduces optimal
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pollution. The shape of the EKC gets aected by the technology of both
countries. When nations engage in trade, the better the technology of the
foreign country, the more resemblance the income pollution path holds to the
EKC. However, the impact of foreign technology on the shape of the EKC is
less for local pollutants than for transboundary pollutants. Regardless, when
countries engage in trade the shape of the EKC is retained. The better the
technology of home country and foreign country, higher resemblance the the
income pollution path takes to the desired inverted U pattern. If the
technology of foreign country is better, increasing the fraction of goods
imported improves the shape of the EKC. Finally, when pollution externality
exists for Country 1 engaging in exports and when pollution externality exists
for Country 2 engaging in higher imports ensures the desired inequalities to
guarantee the shape of the EKC.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 3.2
provides with the literature review. The model is presented in section 3.3.
Section 3.4 looks at the impact of trade on the optimal level of pollution and
the shape of the income pollution path. A demonstration of the results of
Section 3.4 are presented in the form of simulated graphs in Section 3.5.
Finally, Section 3.6 concludes the paper.
3.2 Literature Review
That technology plays a key role in sustainable development and economic
growth is manifest in any discourse on the subject. As early as in 1798,
Malthus pointed out that while human population grows exponentially, food
production grows at an arithmetic rate and so the growth of population would
soon deem the carrying capacity of nature as unsustainable leading to a
Malthusian Catastrophe (such as a war or famine) to bring the population
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back to a sustainable levels. Such pessimistic views were fortunately
invalidated by the Industrial Revolution that followed soon after. However,
with the onset of the industrial revolution emerged new concerns relating to
the sustainability of the environment to withstand unbounded economic
growth. The process of industrialization gave way to new concerns of pollution
and resources depletion.
The 1970s witnessed heated debates on how economic growth would aect
environmental quality. Georgescu-Roegen (1971) expressed that natural
resources and clean environment cannot be sustained for ever if the economies
continue to grow without limit. Around the same time Meadows et al. (1972)
published a report titled \The limits to growth" where they concluded that
dierent natural resources would be depleted with economic growth and even
went as far as to predict possible exhaustion dates for resources such as
chromium, gold and petroleum. They explained that while population and
extraction of natural resources increase exponentially, the discovery and
renewal of natural resources occur linearly and therefore the use or
exploitation of natural resources should at some point in time lead to
exhaustion of these resources. Such a view was vehemently opposed by Cole
(1973) who argued that economic growth would bring about technological
innovations that would relax the constraints on economic resources.
The main idea of the Environmental Kuznets Curve emerged in the early 1990s
through a series of empirical observations. A number of studies were conducted
on dierent pollutants such as CO;NOx; SOx;suspended particulate matter,
municipal waste and lead by Grossman and Kreuger (1991), Shak and
Bandyopadhayay (1992) and Panayotou (1993), and it was found that while
the emission of these pollutants initially increased with the growth in per
capita income, with further progress of economic growth, emissions of these
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pollutants tended to go down. Thus emerged the idea that expedited economic
growth was in fact desirable in order to protect the environment. To that end
Beckerman (1992) pointed out that `least developed countries have decient
resources for the protection of the environment and it is economic growth that
can provide the resources to resolve the environmental problems'.
A similar pattern between income inequality and economic growth was
observed by Kuznets in 1955 who called it the Kuznets Curve. In the early
1993 Panayotou adopted the term and suxed it with \environmental" to give
rise to the term \the Environmental Kuznets's Curve". Henceforth, the
phenomenon of EKC has been widely used to describe the inverted U shaped
pattern of the income pollution path.Following the empirical observations, a
number of economists have sought to give structure and hindsight behind the
existence of the concept. Arrow et al. (1995) state that the EKC pattern can
be explained by the natural progression of economic development from the
clean agrarian societies to polluting industrial economies to clean service based
economies. Others such as Grossman and Kreuger (1991) explain that as
economies grow they undergo three distinct eects (i) the scale eect - where
with economic growth larger scale production and pollution occurs; (ii) the
technology eect - where with economic development better technology is
adopted; and nally (iii) the composition eect - where with economic
prosperity cleaner composition of goods and services are adopted. They
explain that while at the early stages of economic development the scale eect
dominates, with further development the technology eect and the
composition eect take over leading to a decline in pollution with income.
John and Pecchenino (1994) present an overlapping generation model in which
environmental quality is a stock resource that degrades with time unless
maintained by investments in the environment. At the beginning an economy
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begins with zero pollution and sees its environment degrade with pollution. At
low levels of income and high environmental stocks, investments in
environment is not desirable. Eventually, with high income and reduced
environmental stocks, investment in the environment becomes desirable and
thus pollution starts to go down. They thus predict and inverse V shaped
EKC. Jones and Manuelli (1995) propose that pollution involves externalities
and appropriately internalizing these externalities is possible with advanced
institutions that can only be aorded by developed economies. Jaeger (1998)
model that low levels of economic growth are associated with low levels of
pollution where the consumers marginal benet to additional environmental
quality is zero. Therefore at this stage more pollution does not lead to lower
utility. With growth and further pollution, consumers become more sensitive
to increased pollution at which point, depending on the parameters, growth
may be accompanied by improved environmental quality. What ever the
explanation, be it investment in environment or internalizing externalities the
issue of technology is implicitly present in the discussion.
There also exists a wide pool of literature that focuses explicitly on the role of
technology in explaining the EKC pattern in the income pollution path.
Stokey (1998) developed a static model where she shows that when economies
are poor, they can use only the dirtiest technology. Thus early stages of
economic development are marked by rising pollution. But with economic
development clean technologies become economically feasible, adoption of
which lead to reduced pollution with economic growth. Andreoni and Levinson
(2001) create a static model where they show that the shape of the EKC can
be explained by a simple technological link between consumption of a desirable
good and abatement of its undesirable bi-product - which is pollution. They
state that the necessary condition for the EKC pattern to hold is maintaining
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increasing returns to scale in abatement technology. Following this Egli (2005)
propose that rather than IRS, countries tend to exhibit fading IRS. Thus with
high levels of pollution countries exhibit IRS in their abatement technology,
but with cleaner environment, they start to display CRS. For this reason, even
though pollution decreases with rising income, it never really goes to zero.
Plassman and Khanna (2006) build upon the Andreoni and Levinson model.
They show that rather than IRS the feature that explains the shape of the
EKC is that if the scale of pollution is less than the scale of abatement. They
therefore claim that the predictions of Andreoni and Levinson is a special case
of the model that they propose.Filippiadis (2014) developed a dynamic model
in which he showed that the shape of EKC depended on the relative stage of
development of the two countries and their in-between interactions. In his
model, the initial condition of the economy is dependent on the initial stock of
physical capital as well as the total factor productivity.
The existence of EKC has also been explained by international trade in
literature. Again the discussion of technology is implicitly encapsulated in the
discussion. Suri and Chapman (1998) build upon the concept of a pollution
haven where they explain that with economic growth environmental
restrictions in the developed countries pushes the dirty industries to the
developing world where environmental restrictions are more relaxed. Copeland
and Taylor (2001) investigate the linkages between national income, pollution
and international trade. They develop a north-south trade model to investigate
the impact of trade restrictions on the environment and welfare. Dean (1999)
nd that trade liberalization directly aggravates environmental damage via its
inuence on the terms of trade, but indirectly mitigates it via its eect on
income growth. Holladay (2008) investigates the impact of trade liberalization
on the environment. He looks at two distinct sources of pollution - that
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sourcing from consumption and that sourcing from production. He concludes
that when pollution is sourced from consumption, trade liberalization increases
pollution and when pollution sources from production, trade liberalization
reduces pollution. In the literature for international trade and the EKC, the
distinction between local pollutants and global pollutants is not well covered.
Ever since its initiation, research has been conducted to explain and validate
the existence of the EKC by proponents of the concept. At the same time
opponents of the concept has sought to invalidate the existence of the EKC.
For example, Gill et al (2017) conclude that even though the shape of the
EKC may hold for local pollutants it does not for transboundary pollutants.
They further assert that the EKC may have been a basis for policy
development for developed countries in the past. But now with increasing
global pollution, developing countries of todays should avert from the
phenomenon of the EKC in their policy development.
A lot of work has also been undertaken in looking at the empirical evidence
behind the existence of the EKC. Selden and Song (1994) have conrmed the
inverted U pattern in the income pollution path using a cross-national panel of
data on emission of four air pollutants namely suspended particulate matter,
sulfur di-oxide, oxides of nitrogen, and carbon monoxide. However, they
predicted that emissions to decrease only in the very long run with rapid
growth on global emissions to continue for several decades. Grossman and
Kreuger (1995) also examine the relationship between per capita GDP and
four environmental indicators and conclude in favor of the existence of the
EKC. They further provide with some intuitive explanations for the downward
sloping part of the EKC. They explain that as countries grow several factors
come into play to cause the downward trend of pollutants. First, with growth
more stringent environmental policies are adopted as with economic prosperity
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non economic aspects of life such as a clean environment become more
desirable for economic agents. Second, as economies grow they cease to
produce some of the dirtier products and start to import them instead.
Finally, with time and learning from the experiences of the wealthier countries,
countries may adopt cleaner technologies.
In recent times, much of the empirical work has focused on transboundary
pollutants. For example, Apergis (2016) looks at the existence of the EKC in
the emission of CO2across fteen countries and concludes that it does in twelve
out of the fteen countries. Bilgili et al. (2016) also look at the empirical
evidence based on the emission of CO2. However, rather than explaining the
downward sloping part of the EKC with income growth, they attribute it to a
shift in renewable energy with time. Jebli et al. (2016) also study the
existence of EKC using CO2:They examine the impact of renewable energy,
non- renewable energy and trade on the shape of EKC in OECD countries.
In this paper I build upon the discussion of local pollutants and
transboundary pollutants in the presence of trade. I also build upon the
discourse of technology. I look at implications that imports and exports hold
for the pollution pattern when countries with varying technology and thus
varying types of pollutants engage in trade with each other.
3.3 The Model
3.3.1 The Model set up
The model considers single agent countries. There are two countries i 2 f1; 2g
each producing a single commodity. To introduce trade to the model,
I consider that each country retains a fraction of the output produced for own
consumption and exports the remainder to the other country. Let the fraction
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retained by each country be iwith i = 1; 2:Therefore (1  i)represent the
level of export of each country.
Pollution, xi, in each country is generated from production. The social utility
function will therefore be a function of Consumption Ci and pollution xi. Let
the social utility function be additively separable and take the form:
Vi = ui(Ci)  hi(x1; x2) (1)
ui represents the utility from consumption and hi measures the disutility
associated with pollution. Both functions are well behaved and follow the
conventional properties of utility. That is, utility is concave, twice continuously
dierentiable and rising in consumption. Concavity of the functions ensures
diminishing marginal utility associated with consumption. hi(:)is convex,
twice continuously dierentiable and rising is pollution. The convexity of the
curve portrays rising marginal disutility with additional units of pollution.





2; ifCi  1
1
2 ; otherwise:
In the equation above,  is the risk aversion indicator and takes a value
greater than 0: A higher value of  represents a higher degree of risk
averseness. Disutility from pollution takes the form:
hi =

2 (l1x1 + l2x2)); (0  li  1); i = 1; 2
 is the parameter capturing pollution perception and takes a value greater
than 0. li measures the degree of pollution externality for each country. For
any given country li attached to its own pollution xi will take the value of 1,
meaning that the pollution generated at home will be fully exposed to the
agents of that respective country. The value of liattached to the other
countries' pollution can take a value equal to or in between 0 and 1. This
means the extent to which the foreign country's pollution will aect the home
country can vary. If it takes a value of 0, it means that pollution generated in
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the foreign country is strictly local and will not aect the home country at all.
This is referred to as a case of local pollution. If it takes a value between 0 and
1, it means that some fraction of the pollution generated in the foreign
country will permeate into the home country and is termed as the case of
transboundary pollution. When the value takes a value of 1 it means that all of
the pollution generated in the foreign country transgresses into the home
country - the case of global pollution.
Output in country i depends upon income. In addition, the production of
output generates pollution xi:Pollution is bound from above by the maximum
possible pollution in a given country. This maximum pollution is a function of
technology. The better the technology, the lower will be the limit to maximum





Because the model considers two countries with homogeneous income, there is
no subscript attached to income y.xi = y
irepresents the maximum upper
bound to pollution set in a country. i is the technology parameter taking a
value between 0 and 1. The lower the value of i the more advanced is the
technology of a given country and therefore the lower will be the value of
maximum permissible pollution. At any given level of pollution max, when the
dirtiest technology is used, xi = y
i , and thus qi = y. Given the model setup,
the consumption possibility of Country 1 can be written as:
C1 = 1y
x1
y1 + (1  2)y x2y2
The social utility function of Country 1 as faced by the social planner is:
V1 = [1y
x1
y1 + (1  2)y x2y2 ]  2 [1y x1y1 + (1  2)y x2y2 ]2   2 (x1 + l2x2)2
Taking the rst order derivative with respect to x1 gives the following solution










The following sections investigate the impact of trade among countries with
varying technology on the optimal level of pollution as well as the shape of the
EKC. The analysis begins with an assessment of trade on the scope for
pollution substitutability.
3.3.2 The Scope for pollution substitution
The possibility of pollution substitution can be seen by taking the derivative of





2 21+   l221 y2 21+ < 0 (3)
The negativity of equation (3) above ensures the possibility of pollution
substitution between Country 1 and Country 2. The rst term showcases the
pollution substitution made possible by trade and the second part shows the
pollution substitution made possible by the existence of pollution externality
in Country 2. How trade aects the scope for pollution substitution has
already been covered in my second paper. In this part I want to focus on how
the dierence in technology of the two countries aects the extent of pollution
substitution when countries engage in trade.
Proposition 7 The more advanced the technology of the foreign country,
engaging in imports makes the scope for pollution substitution stronger. The
more advanced the technology of domestic country, engaging in exports, makes
the scope for pollution substitution stronger.
Proof. To see how the technology of the foreign country aects pollution






2 21+ > 0 (4)
The higher the value of 2 the weaker will be the scope for pollution
substitution. A higher value of 2 indicates a country with lower level of
technology where the upper bound to admissible pollution will be higher. This
means, the more advanced the technology of the foreign country, the lower will
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be the value of 2and thus the stronger will be the scope of pollution
substitution. However, the technology of the foreign country will inuence
pollution substitution only when country 1 chooses to engage in imports. Thus
importing from countries that are more technologically advanced, will allow a
country to reduce its own pollution more.



















Own technology aects the scope for pollution substitution even when countries
do not engage in trade, so long as the pollutant is transboundary or global.
When it comes to local pollution, trade is the only route through which own
technology will aect the scope for pollution substitution. Focusing on the rst
two terms of equation (5) above, the sum of the rst two terms will be less




2 . As long as this inequality is
satised, the second derivative above will be negative, meaning the higher value
of 1stronger will be the scope for pollution substitution. This means that when
home countries have less advanced technologies, the scope for them to engage
in pollution substitution by keeping the fraction of own output exported or
(1  1) < 1  ( y2 21 ) 12 . If exports is more than this, then the higher the value
of 1the lower will be the scope for pollution substitution.
Finally, the scope for pollution substitution gets stronger with the increase in
the level of pollution externality in the foreign country. This conclusion is
derived by observing the second part of equation (3). However, transboundary
or global pollution is aected only by exports and not by imports. Equation 3
shows that the higher the value of t lower the scope of substitution through
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global emissions. By increasing the fraction of own output exported countries
can increase the strength of pollution substitution in the case of
transboundary pollutants. The more advanced own technology is more impact
fraction of output exported will have on the scope for pollution substitution.
The implications of the level of home technology and foreign technology in
aecting the direction of trade in order to strengthen the scope of pollution
substitution is summarized in Table 3.1 below. The impact is looked at the
point of view of an improvement in technology, i.e, the value of i.
Table 3.1: Impact on the strength of pollution substitution when
countries with dierent technology engage in trade.
Strength of Pollution Substitution of:
Local Pollutants Trans boundary Pollutants
1 # Increases when (1  1) > 1  ( y2 21 )
1
2 Increases with (1  1)
2 # Increases with (1  2) No aect of trade.
3.4 Model Solution and Implications of Trade
Solving the model for both countries, the solution for optimal pollution for








I will now use this solution to carry out the rest of my analysis. First, I will
investigate what happens to the level of optimal pollution when pollution is
strictly local for both countries, strictly global for both countries, and nally
pollution externality varies for the two countries. I will then investigate the
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implication for trade on optimal pollution for each of the scenarios. Finally I
will look at the implication that this holds for the shape of the income
pollution path. All analysis will be carried out in light of the fact that the
technology of the two countries are distinctly dierent.
3.4.1 Impact on the optimal level of pollution
3.4.1.1 Implication for pollution externality
Proposition 8 The higher the extent of pollution externalities of the two
countries, the higher will be the optimal level of pollution.
Proof. Holding all other factors unchanged, if the nature of pollutants













Since A= > A and B= > B; but 4A < 4B;(where 4A = A=  A, and
4B = B=  B) I conclude that when pollutants generated in both countries are
strictly local, the optimal level of pollution will be lower than when pollutants




> 0 meaning that the higher the level of pollution externality
generated by Country1, the higher will be the level of optimal pollution.
@x1
@l2
> 0 . I therefore conclude that when pollutants exhibit the nature of
transboundary or global pollutants, be it in either one of the countries or both
countries , optimal pollution will always be higher than when pollutants are
strictly local.
3.4.1.2 Implications of technology of home country and foreign
country
When countries engage in trade the abatement technology of both countries
aect the optimal pollution decision. The direction of impact is also the same,
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in the sense, the higher the value of 1or 2 the higher will be the level of
optimal pollution. What is interesting to me is to observe, when the
technologies of the two countries are dierent, what pattern of trade will
benet in reducing the level of optimal pollution. A avor of this discussion is
provided in Section 3.2 where it can be seen that the scope of pollution
substitution becomes stronger when countries engage in imports with reducing
values of 2: In other words, the better the abatement technology of the
foreign country, better is the scope of pollution substitution through imports.
In this section I try to elaborate on that discussion by looking at the relative
impact of the two technologies on the optimal level of pollution.
Proposition 9 When the abatement technology of the foreign country is
lower, engaging in import can reduce the level of optimal pollution, and when it
is higher, engaging in export can reduce the optimal level of pollution. When
the abatement technology of home country is less advanced countries should
engage in imports and when the abatement technology of the foreign country is
less advanced, countries should engage in exports if they wish to reduced the
optimal level of pollution.
Proof. Taking the derivative of optimal pollution with respect to 2 and 1 will














A positive value for equation (7) will ensure that the higher the value fraction
of output of Country 2 imported, the lower will be the level of optimal pollution.
Similarly, in order to show the conditions under which engaging in exports will
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reduce the optimal level of pollution, one has to set equation (8) as positive.
Since the optimal level of pollution is positive it must be that A > 0and B > 0.
Therefore sucient conditions for setting equation (7) and (8) as positive are:
 l2y1 2 + (412   1)y3 1 22  0 (7a) and
22y
2 22 +(21 + 212  1)y4 21 22  ( l11 + l2(1  1))y2 1 2 
0 (7b) for equation (7) to be positive and
y1 1 + (222   2)y3 1 22  0 (8a)and
21y
2 21 + (212 + 22   2)y4 21 22   (l1(1  2)  l22)y2 1 2 
0 (8b) for equation (8) to be positive.





). Thus the lower the
value of 2 the stronger the inequality. When Country 2 enjoys advanced
technology, engaging in import can reduce the optimal level of pollution. Note,
the higher the level of l2, that is the more pollution externality there is the
weaker will be the inequality. That indicates that the more pollution externality
there exists, the possibility of reducing optimal pollution by engaging in imports
will go down. From equation (7b) I get
22y
1 + (21 + 212   1)y2 1  ( l11 + l2(1  1))y2 . The inequality
will be stronger the higher the value of 1. Thus when the technology of home
country is poorer, engaging in import can reduce the optimal level of pollution.
Equation (8a) gives y2 22  
(2 222 ) . The higher the value of 2 the
stronger the inequality. When the abatement technology of the foreign country
is poorer, engaging in exports can reduce the optimal level of pollution.
Equation (8b) gives
21y
2 + (212 + 
2
2   2)y2 2  (l1(1  2)  l22)y1 . The higher the
value of 2the stronger the inequality.
Thus I conclude, when the technology of the foreign country is poorer engaging
in export can reduce the optimal level of pollution and when it is better,
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engaging in import can reduce the optimal level of pollution.
The conclusions of this section are in line with the partial conclusions drawn
in Section 3.2. When Country 2 has improved technology, by increasing the
fraction of q2imported in Country 1, Country 1 can seek to reduce optimal
pollution. If the technology is poorer, the fraction of output imported should
be reduced. When Country two has poor technology, Country 1 can reduce
optimal pollution by increasing the fraction of q1exported to Country 2.
Clearly, a dierence in abatement technology can aect the pattern and
direction of trade, when the objective of trade is pollution reduction.
3.4.2 Impact on the shape of the income-pollution path
The ultimate interest of study in this paper is when countries with dierent
technologies enter into trade with each other, what shape will the income
pollution path of the country take? The obvious desired option is the EKC
pattern displayed by the inverted U-shape. The necessary condition for this is
for the second derivative with respect to income of the optimal pollution path
to take a negative value. In this section I provide some sucient conditions for
such a path to be consistent. A glance at the equation for optimal pollution
will suce to vouch for the fact that the second derivative will be extremely
lengthy and complex to look at. The full derivative and the derivation of the
conditions are presented in the Appendix.
After introducing trade among countries with dierent technologies, the
second derivative of optimal pollution with respect to income will be negative
if the following conditions are satised.
1. Overall, the lower the value of 2 the more technologically advanced
Country 2 is, the stronger will be the inequalities to ensure the negativity of
the second derivative.
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2. The lower the value of 1, the more technologically advanced Country1 is,
increasing the fraction of own good exported, enhances the strength of the
inequalities to ensure the negativity of the second derivative. The value of 1
should be less than 0.5.
3. When the pollution externality of Country 2 is zero, l2 = 0, the fraction of
goods retained in Country 2 should be less than half. In other words, fraction
of import from Country 2 should be bigger than half ((1  2) > 1=2 ).If
2 = 1=2;the value of 2 should be lower than the value of 1.
4. When both pollutants are strictly local, l1 = l2 = 0 , the fraction of output
of Country 2 imported by Country 1 should be greater than fraction of own
goods retained at home, i.e, (1  2) > 1.
5. When the pollution externality in Country 1 is positive, but the pollution of
Country 2 is strictly local, l1 > 0; l2 = 0, the desired inequalities will hold as
long as (1  2) = 1or (1  2) > 1: For (1  2) < 1 the inequality will
become weaker even for lower values of 2.
6. When the pollution externality of Country 2 is positive (1  2) should be
higher, and when pollution externality of Country 1 is positive, (1  1) should
be higher.
3.5 Demonstration of Results
In this section I present with some graphical representation of the results
proposed in the previous section with the help of simulation. The values
assigned to parameters are within the range specied by the model. In the
model  measures the risk averseness of an individual and can take a value
bigger than 0. For this section I assume  = 2: captures the pollution
perception in the model and is assumed that  2 R+. The value assigned to 
in this section is 3. Given this I proceed to present with the conclusions of
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Section 3.4.
Proposition 7 presents with the idea that when countries engage in imports
with other countries that have better technology, the scope for pollution
substitution becomes stronger. This concept is further developed in
Proposition 9 where it is found that when countries engage in imports from
countries that have better technology, the optimal level of pollution can be
reduced. This however is dependent upon the nature of pollutant of the
foreign country. The higher the level of pollution externality generated, the
weaker will be the impact on optimal pollution through imports. In other
words, pollution substitution through imports is strongest for the case of local
pollutants and goes down for the case of transboundary or global pollutants.
Table 3.2 provides a summary of this discussion below.
Table 3.2: Comparision of impact of import when technology of
foreign country is dierent, across dierent types of pollutants.
Local Pollutant Transboundary Pollutant Glboal Pollutant
Low 2
High2
For the simulation results presented in Table 3.2, the technology parameter of
the domestic country is set at a mid way with 1 = 0:5. For the two types of
technologies of Country 2, when Country 2 is assumed to have advanced
technology, 2 = 0:2 and when Country 2 is assumed to have a poor
technology, 2 = 0:8. When pollutants are assumed to be local, l1 = l2 = 0.
For transboundary pollutants, the level of externality is set at 0.5 and nally
for global pollutants, l1 = l2 = 1. The table makes it clear, that as the extent
of pollution externality increases the ability to reduce the level of optimal
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pollution by engaging in imports goes down. However, when the technology of
the foreign country is more advanced, engaging in import can still reduce the
optimal level of pollution to a certain extent. The better the technology of the
foreign country, the more will be impact on optimal pollution through imports
for every type of pollutant.
Proposition 7 and 9 also claim that when the technology of the home country
is more advanced, engaging in export can have a positive impact on the
optimal level of pollution. Again, the extent of impact varies with the level of
externality generated by the pollutants. Table 3.3 below presents a summary
of the impact of import on the optimal level of pollution when the nature of
pollutants vary.
Table 3.3: Comparision of impact of export on the optimal level of
pollution when technology varies and across dierent types of
pollutants.
Local Pollutant Transboundary Pollutant Global Pollutant
Low1
High1
Table 3.3 above summarizes the impact of export. This time, the technology of
the foreign country is set at a midpoint at 2 = 0:5: For the case of advanced
domestic technology 1 = 0:2 and for the case of poor domestic technology
2 = 0:8: For the nature of pollutants, for local pollutants, pollution
externality is assumed to be zero, for transboundary, it is assumed to be 0.5
and nally for global pollutants, pollution externality is assumed to be 1. For
the case of export, it is found the higher the extent of pollution externality, the
lower will be the optimal level of pollution when countries engage in exports.
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Also, the lower the value of 1 that is the more advanced the technology of the
home country, the greater the impact of export on reducing optimal pollution.
For the last part of this section, I look at the impact of trade when
technologies of the two countries vary on the income pollution path. I look at
the case for local pollutants and global pollutants for two distinct cases. One
for when a country with high level of technology engages in trade with a
country with a low level of technology. And a second for when a country with
a low level of technology engages in trade with a country with high level of
technology. Table 3.4 below, summarizes the ndings.
Table 3.4: Comparision of impact of trade on EKC for dierent
technologies and across dierent types of pollutants.





The table above demonstrates that the impact of trade on the shape of the
income pollution path is more severe for the case of local pollutants than for
global pollutants. Particularly when a low tech country, engages with a high
tech one, it can be seen that the turning point of EKC is brought drastically
forward. The last part of section 3.4 concludes that the lower the level of
technologies of both countries the more likely it is that the income pollution




Engaging in trade does hold implications for a country's welfare. On the one
hand engaging in trade increases the range of consumption goods available. On
the other hand, engaging in trade also impacts pollution. How trade aects
pollution is ambiguous. Engaging in trade can create a scope for pollution
substitution, or it can lead to increased pollution. As a result of this, trade
can also impact upon the shape of the income- pollution path of a country.
How trade will aect these variables depend upon the direction of trade as
well as the relative technological stand of the trading countries. In this paper I
have investigated what happens to the scope of pollution substitution, the
level of optimal pollution and the shape of the income pollution path, when
countries with dierent technologies engage in trade with each other.
In this I paper I have established that when countries with dierent
technologies engage in trade, they create a scope for pollution substitution.
This can create implications for the direction of trade. The paper concludes,
that the more advanced the technology of home country, by exporting a larger
fraction of own output, countries can seek to reduce the level of local pollution
as well as transboundary pollution. When the foreign countries are more
technologically advanced, increasing the fraction of goods imported can reduce
local pollution. However, the model nds that such a case does not aect the
case for transboundary pollution.
The paper then explores the impact on optimal pollution when countries with
dierent technologies trade with each other. First the model nds that when
countries engage in trade with each other, the optimal level of pollution is
lower when pollutants of both countries are strictly local, than when either one
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or both coutries emit transboundary or global pollutants. Overall it is found
that when fractions of goods are imported from countries with better
technology, optimal pollution at home can be reduced. When the level of
technology at home is better, exporting a larger fraction of own goods can
reduce the level of optimal pollution.
Finally the paper focuses on the impact of trade among countries with
dierent technologies on the shape of the inocme pollution path. The likeliness
of income pollution path to follow the desired EKC pattern increases when
Country 1 imports from Country 2 who has a better technology. When the
technology of Country 1 is better, the likeliness goes up with Country 1
exporting a larger fraction of own output to Country 2. The implications of
trade are stronger for the case of local pollution than for transboundary or
global pollution. However, even for the case of transboundary or global
pollution, the shape of the EKC is retained. When the pollutant of Country 1
is transboundary, increasing the fraction of own output exported and when the
pollutant of Country 2 is transboundary increasing the fraction of foreign
output imported helps the shape of of EKC more.
3.7Appendix
Appendix A: Derivation of Model
A1: The case of Local Pollutants
When income in the two countries are homogeneous with dierent levels of
technology of each country, the Social Utility Function that the social planner
seeks to optimize is:
V1 = [1y
x1
y1 + (1  2)y x2y2 ]  2 [1y x1y1 + (1  2)y x2y2 ]2   2 (x1)2




y1   [1y x1y1 + (1  2)y x2y2 ]1y1 1   (x1) = 0









The social utility function facing the social planner of Country 2 is:
V2 = [(1  1)y x1y1 + 2y x2y2 ]  2 [(1  1)y x1y1 + 2y x2y2 ]2   2 (x2)2
The FOC with respect to x2 gives:
2y
1
y2   [(1  1)y x1y1 + 2y x2y2 ]2y1 2   (x2) = 0









Plugging in the optimal value of x2 from equation (2) into equation (1) gives









A2. The case of Transboundary or Global Pollutants
When income in the two countries are homogeneous with dierent levels of
technology of each country, the Social Utility Function that the social planner
seeks to optimize is:
V1 = [1y
x1
y1 + (1  2)y x2y2 ]  2 [1y x1y1 + (1  2)y x2y2 ]2   2 (x1 + l2x2)2
The FOC with respect to x1gives:
1y
1
y1   [1y x1y1 + (1  2)y x2y2 ]1y1 1   (x1 + l2x2) = 0









The social utility function facing the social planner of Country 2 is:
V2 = [(1  1)y x1y1 + 2y x2y2 ]  2 [(1  1)y x1y1 + 2y x2y2 ]2   2 (l1x1 + x2)2
The FOC with respect to x2 gives:
2y
1
y2   [(1  1)y x1y1 + 2y x2y2 ]2y1 2   (l1x1 + x2) = 0









Plugging in the optimal value of x2 from equation (4) into equation (3) gives








Appendix B: Proof of Propositions
B1. Proof of Proposition 1
The rst proposition explores the scope of pollution substitution. In other
words it looks at the impact of level of pollution of Country 2 on the level of
pollution of Country 1 when countries with dierent levels of abatement
technology engage in trade. To see this I take the derivative of optimal





2 21+   l221 y2 21+ < 0 (5)
The negative sign on the derivative above suggests dependence in optimal
pollution decision among countries.
Proposition 1 states that when the technology of the foreign country is better
the domestic country should engage in import, and when the technology level
of the home country is better, the domestic country should engage in export.
To see the impact of foreign country on the scope of pollution substitution







The derivative is positive, meaning the higher the the value of 2 the weaker
will be scope of pollution substitution. In other words, the better the level of
foreign technology, the lower the value of 2 the stronger will be the scope of
pollution substitution. Note that the derivative above will have a positive
value only for a positive value of (1  2):Thus unless Country 1 engages in
imports, the technology level of the foreign country will not have an impact on
the optimal pollution of the home country. I therefore conclude that when the
technology of the foreign country is better, Country 1 should engage in import
in order to make the scope for pollution substitution stronger.
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Next I investigate the impact of domestic technology on the scope of pollution













The sign attached to the derivative above is uncertain. If I set the derivative
to negative, it will mean that the higher the value of 1, the lower the level of
domestic technology, the stronger will be the scope of pollution substitution.





2 21+  0) 1 > ( y2 21 )1=2 .
Thus for higher values of 1; the negativity of the derivative will be
guaranteed by keeping low levels of exports. When the domestic technology is
more advanced, one can raise the level of exports and still maintain the
negativity of the derivative.
B2. Proof of Proposition 2















Since the optimal level of pollution is positive, it must mean that A > 0 and
B > 0: If the pollution externality of Country 2 is 0 and Country 1 does not
engage in any import, the term in the bracket will be equal to 0. Otherwise it
will be positive. I therefore conclude that the higher the level of pollution







32 t(1 21)y5 21 32+212(1 21)y3 21 22 222 y1 2 (2y2 22 )+2l112((1 1)y3 1 22
B2
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The derivative above will be positive so long as 1  1=2: Therefore, so long as
Country 1 retains half or more of its own output, the higher the level of
pollution externality of Country 2 the higher will be the optimal level of
pollution.
I therefore conclude that the higher the level of pollution externality of both
countries, the higher will be the optimal level of pollution.
B3. Conditions under which the second derivative of optimal pollution with respect to income will be negative.
The optimal pollution function is:
x1 =
1y
1 1   l22y1 2 + 12(21   1)y3 1 22
21 y
2 21 + 22 y2 22 + 2(1  l1l2) + (21 2 + 122   12)y4 21 22   (l11(1  2) + l22(1  1))y2 1 2
 A
B






f(4  21   22)(21 2 + 122   12)y3 21 22 + ((2  22)22 y1 22
+(2  21)21 y1 21   (2  1   2)(2l2(1  1) + 1l1(1  2))y1 1 2g
  (12(22 1)y3 1 22+1y1 1 2l2y1 2 )B2
f(3  21   22)(4  21   22)(21 2 + 122   12)y2 21 22+
(1  21)(2  22)22 y1 22 + (1  21)(2  21)21 y1 21




To give it a meaningful frame, I group the equation in the following way.
Let [1] = 12(22   1)y3 1 22 + 1y1 1   2l2y1 2 ,
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[2a] =
(3 1  22)12(22  1)y3 1 22 + (1 1)1y 1   (1 2)2l2y1 2 ,
[2b] = f(4  21  22)(21 2 + 122   12)y3 21 22 +((2  22)22 y1 22
+(2  21)21 y1 21   (2 1  2)(2l2(1  1) + 1l1(1  2))y1 1 2g,
[3a] = 12(22   1)y3 1 22 + 1y1 1   2l2y1 2 ,
[3b] = f(3  21   22)(4  21   22)(21 2 + 122   12)y2 21 22+
(1  21)(2  22)22 y1 22 + (1  21)(2  21)21 y1 21
 (1 1 2)(2 1 2)(2l2(1  1) + 1l1(1  2))y1 1 2g, and nally
[4] = (2  1   22)(3  1   22)12(22   1)y1 1 22   1(1 
1)1y
1 1 + 2(1  2)2l2y1 2





B3   2[2a][2b]B2   [3a][3b]B2 + [4]B
It is already established that B > 0: If I can show that [1] ; [2a] ,[2b],[3a],[3b],
and [4] < 0, then the second order derivative of optimal pollution with respect
to income will be negative.
I now list some sucient conditions that ensure the negativity of the second
order derivative.
Condition 1
12(22   1)y3 1 22 + 1y1 1   2l2y1 2 < 0
When l2 = 0 =) 12(1  22)y3 1 22 > 1y1 1
This is possible as long as 2 < 1=2: Lower the value of 2 stronger will be the
inequality.




Lower the value of 1smaller the value of RHS. 1 should be reduced to to
maintain inequality. This implies technology of country 1 goes up, fraction
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exported should go up for the case of positive pollution externality.
|||||||||||||x||||||||||||{
Condition 2a
(3 1 22)12(22 1)y3 1 22 +(1 1)1y 1 (1 2)2l2y1 2 < 0
Notice Condition 2a is the rst derivative of Condition 1 with respect to y:
Thus under the same restrictions as Condition 1, Condition 2a will also hold.
When l2 = 0 =) (3  1   22)12(1  22)y2 1 22 > (1  1)1y 1
Again, this is possible as long as 2 < 1=2: Lower the value of 2 stronger will
be the inequality.
When l2 > 0 =) (3  1   22)12(22   1)y2 1 22 + (1  1)1y 1 <
(1  2)2l2y 2
=) 1 < (1 2)2l2y
 2
y 1 (2(22 1)(3 1 22)y2 22+(1 1))
Again, lower the value of 1smaller will be the right hand side. In that case 1
has to be reduced to maintain inequality. When 1is lower, and there exists








1 21   (2  1   2)(2l2(1  1) + 1l1(1  2))y1 1 2g < 0
2bi:l1 = l2 = 0
(4 21 22)( 21 2 122 +12)y3 21 22 > ((2 21)y1 21(21 +22 )
For the inequality to hold, (1  2) > 1. The lower the value of 2 the
stronger the inequality.
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When pollution is strictly local, importing a larger fraction from Country 2 will
make the inequality stronger.
|||||||
2bii:l1 > 0; l2 = 0
f(4  21   22)(21 2 + 122   12)y3 21 22 + ((2  22)22 y1 22
+(2 21)21 y1 21  (2 1 2)(2l2(1  1) + 1l1(1  2))y1 1 2<0
=) (4  21   22)( 21 2   122 + 12)y3 21 22 + (2  1  
2)(1l1(1  2))y1 1 2 > ((2  21)y1 21(21 + 22 )
1. if (1  2) = 1
(2  1   2)(1l1(1  2))y1 1 2 > ((2  21)y1 21(21 + 22 ) Inequality
will hold stronger with lower value of 2.
2. if (1  2) < 1 =)
 (4  21   22)( 21 2   122 + 12)y3 21 22 + (2  1   2)(1l1(1 
2))y
1 1 2 > ((2  21)y1 21(21 + 22 )
Inequality will become weaker. lower the value of 2 weaker the inequality.
3. if (1  2) > 1 =)
+(4  21   22)( 21 2   122 + 12)y3 21 22 + (2  1   2)(1l1(1 
2))y
1 1 2 > ((2  21)y1 21(21 + 22 )
Inequality will become stronger. Lower the value of 2 stronger will be the
inequality.
4. Overall higher the level of pollution externality of country 1 stronger the
inequality.
||||||||||
2biii:l1 = 0; l2 > 0
f(4  21   22)(21 2 + 122   12)y3 21 22 + ((2  22)22 y1 22
+(2 21)21 y1 21 (2 1 2)(2l2(1 1)+1l1(1 2))y1 1 2 < 0
=) (4  21   22)( 21 2   122 + 12)y3 21 22 + (2  1  
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2)(2l2(1  1))y1 1 2 > ((2  21)y1 21(21 + 22 )
1. Same as 2bii.
2. Bigger the value of (1  1) stronger the inequality in the case where
pollution externality exists for Country2.
|||||||||
2biv: l1 > 0; l2 > 0
(4  21   22)(21 2 + 122   12)y3 21 22 + ((2  21)22 y1 21 +
(2  21)21 y1 21  (2 1 2)(2l2(1  1) + 1l1(1  2))y1 1 2 < 0
=) (4  21   22)( 21 2   122 + 12)y3 21 22 + (2  1  
2)(1l1(1  2) + 2l2(1  1))y1 1 2 > ((2  21)y1 21(21 + 22 )
1. Same as 2bii.
2. When country 1 has pollution externality, importing helps the inequality
and when country2 has externality exporting helps the inequality.
|||||||||||{x||||||||||||
Condition 3a
12(22   1)y3 1 22 + 1y1 1   2l2y1 2 < 0




f(3  21   22)(4  21   22)(21 2 + 122   12)y2 21 22+
(1  21)(2  22)22 y1 22 + (1  21)(2  21)21 y1 21
 (1  1   2)(2  1   2)(2l2(1  1) + 1l1(1  2))y1 1 2g < 0
Notice that Condition 3b is the rst order derivative of Condition 2b with
respect to y: Therefore the conditions of here will also be the same.




(2  1   22)(3  1   22)12(22   1)y1 1 22   1(1  1)1y1 1 +
2(1  2)2l2y1 2 < 0
=) (2 1 22)(3 1 22)12(22 1)y1 1 22+2(1 2)2l2y1 2 <
1(1  1)1y1 1
1. If 2 = 1=2, =) 22(1  2)l2y1 2 < 1(1  1)1y1 1
If there exists pollution externality in Country2 then inequality will hold for
2 < 1 or 2l2 < 1:
2. If 2 > 1=2 =) (2  1   22)(3  1   22)12(22   1)y1 1 22 +
2(1  2)2l2y1 2 < 1(1  1)1y1 1
Inequality will be weak. It will be stronger for smaller values of 2.
3. if 2 < 1=2 =)  (2  1   22)(3  1   22)12(22   1)y1 1 22 +
2(1  2)2l2y1 2 < 1(1  1)1y1 1
Inequality is stronger.
Again when l2 is positive increasing (1  2) helps the inequality.
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